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INTRODUCTION 
It is an all too common story: A new organization with a fresh 
approach bursts onto the nonprofit scene, shaking up the status quo 
and spurring great leaps forward on their issue of choice, seeming to 
make every dollar support greater impact than was possible ever 
before.  And yet, despite the ability to attract consistent funding and 
inspire its peers, the organization shutters just years after its 
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founding.1  Consider FORGE, an organization that helped over 
70,000 refugees in Zambia and Botswana to build both short-term and 
long-term capacity by supporting initiatives developed by the 
beneficiaries themselves.2  Such initiatives included building libraries, 
developing computer literacy and training programs, and establishing 
micro-financing for agricultural workers.3  Despite FORGE’s 
meaningful impact and responsive approach to its work, it closed after 
a modest nine years.4  The self-reported cause of their closure: a lack 
of unrestricted funding and, as a result, underinvestment in the 
internal infrastructure necessary to maintain the organization.5 
Dubbed the “Nonprofit Starvation Cycle” by the Stanford Social 
Innovation Review, the cycle of underfunded nonprofits continues.6  
There are a variety of reasons for this cycle: funders and nonprofits 
alike conflate higher overhead with reduced impact; grant-making 
foundations7 are reticent to provide more flexible funding; or, due to 
restrictions placed on how grants to international organizations can 
be made, funders are under the false perception that the only way to 
make grants is through restricted project grants8 that do not allow for 
investments in organizational infrastructure.9  Though the problem 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. See, e.g., Kjerstin Erickson, Nonprofit Emaciation: Confessions of a Do-
Gooder Who Starved an Organization, ROOT CAUSE: PERSPECTIVES BLOG (Nov. 
2004), http://www.rootcause.org/blog/nonprofit-emaciation-confessions-of-a-do-
gooder-who-starved-an-organization [https://perma.cc/6YWN-UA9P]. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. at 2.  While lifetimes of NGOs vary depending on the sector, most 
NGOs seek a lifetime that spans decades rather than years in order to build and 
sustain change over time. E.g., Randolph Kent et al., The Future of 
NonGovernmental Organisations in the Humanitarian Sector, HUMANITARIAN 
FUTURES PROGRAMME, at 3 (Aug. 2013), http://www.humanitarianfutures.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/The-Future-of-Humanitarian-NGOs-HFP-Discussion-
Paper-Aug2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MRU-HQHM] (noting that many NGOs in 
the humanitarian sector are reaching the age of fifty). 
 5. See Erickson, supra note 1. 
 6. See Ann Goggins Gregory & Don Howard, The Nonprofit Starvation Cycle, 
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (2009), at 49–50, 
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_nonprofit_starvation_cycle [https://perma.cc/99JU-
2AZM]. 
 7. For the purposes of this Note, the term “foundation” refers to private 
foundations, as well as both operating and non-operating foundations who operate 
grant making programs.  See Knowledge Base: What Is the Difference Between a 
Private Foundation and a Public Charity?, GRANTSPACE, 
http://grantspace.org/tools/knowledge-base/Funding-Resources/Foundations/private-
foundations-vs-public-charities [https://perma.cc/7F3N-J29M] (defining “Private 
foundations”). 
 8. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 9. See infra Section I.B.1. 
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likely stems from some combination of these issues, this Note focuses 
on the latter two issues. 
Funders are beginning to acknowledge the issues raised above, and 
there is a growing movement to provide greater flexibility in the 
grants that they make.10  This flexibility ensures that grantees can 
remain responsive to the field and effective in creating the change 
that both the grantee and the grantor want to see in society, while 
also building the institutional capacity necessary to function and 
adapt to each organization’s constantly changing environment most 
effectively.11  The most common way for a foundation to provide this 
flexibility is through a general support grant—a grant in which funds 
are not tied to particular budget lines or outcomes, and instead 
provides the grantee with flexibility to determine how funds are 
expended.12  This approach stands in sharp contrast to project-
support grants—the more typical approach to grant making—where 
funds are tied to particular outcomes and budget lines and, if the 
grantee desires to shift funds between budget-lines, they must receive 
prior approval from the funder.13 
For foundations that have an international focus, however, 
providing general support grants is typically understood to be a rare 
possibility.  When a foundation14 is funding an organization that is not 
                                                                                                                                      
 10. See infra Section I.B.1; see also The Beauty of the General Support Grant, 
GRANTCRAFT (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.grantcraft.org/takeaways/the-beauty-of-the-
general-support-grant [https://perma.cc/9VXR-DPPW]; J MCCRAY, GRANTMAKERS 
FOR EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS, IS GRANTMAKING GETTING SMARTER?: A 
NATIONAL STUDY OF PHILANTHROPIC PRACTICE 7 (2014), 
https://www.giarts.org/sites/default/files/Is-Grantmaking-Getting-Smarter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8B7Z-F3T6]. 
 11. See generally Gregory & Howard, supra note 6, at 53; The Beauty of the 
General Support Grant, supra note 10; see also MCCRAY, supra note 10, at 7, 23. 
 12. See, e.g., General Operating Support (or Unrestricted) Grants, GRANTCRAFT 
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.grantcraft.org/takeaways/general-operating-support-or-
unrestricted-grants [https://perma.cc/2E2R-MBRT] (discussing how general support 
allows grantees to “invest” in themselves by building capacity or investing in new 
areas of work); Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the Capacity of Our 
Nonprofit Sector, GRANTCRAFT (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://www.grantcraft.org/blog/unrestricted-core-support-strengthening-the-capacity-
of-our-nonprofit-secto [https://perma.cc/XAD7-9RCV] (“ . . . [C]ore support funding 
provides nonprofit organizations with the working capital necessary to sustain day-to-
day operations and to build a well-managed and fully operational infrastructure.”); 
see infra Section I.B.2.  
 13. E.g., The Beauty of the General Support Grant, supra note 10 (“‘Engage 
grantees more, but put fewer restrictions on their money.’  If the money isn’t 
restricted, then you don’t have to get into silly dances about how they met the letter 
of the contract and you met the letter of the tax laws, and you can really engage them 
about how to be as effective as possible.”); see infra Section I.B.1. 
 14. See infra Section I.A. 
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a registered 501(c)(3) public charity15 (which encompasses many 
international organizations), they must adhere to a particular set of 
rules under a framework called expenditure responsibility.16  While 
these rules seek to ensure that funds are spent for charitable 
purposes, they are consistently interpreted to be quite limiting in 
terms of the amount of flexibility that foundations can provide to 
grantees.17  This Note argues that there is greater potential for 
flexibility in the interpretation of the expenditure responsibility rules 
than practitioners commonly recognize.  Accordingly, this Note is 
dedicated to offering an interpretation for how foundations can make 
general support grants under the expenditure responsibility rules 
while staying within the margins of pre-existing law.  Section I.A of 
this Note explores some background on what foundations are, their 
role in society, and how they foster change through grant making.  
Following an explanation in Section I.B of the basic types of grants 
that foundations can provide, Section I.C then explores the particular 
legal framework that governs grant making to international 
organizations.  In Part II, this Note identifies the sources of tension 
between common foundation practice and the plain text of the law 
with regards to general support in the expenditure responsibility 
context, and offers a variety of legal and policy explanations for both 
why it is and is not appropriate to interpret the expenditure 
responsibility requirements in a manner that allows for general 
support grant making.  In Part III, this Note offers three potential 
approaches to providing a general support grants under the 
expenditure responsibility rules and several recommendations to the 
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for how to clarify relevant 
regulations to confirm that the proposed approaches rest on solid 
legal ground. 
                                                                                                                                      
 15. A 501(c)(3) organization is organized and operated for charitable, 
educational, religious, scientific, or other reasons specified in §501(c)(3) of the U.S. 
Tax Code.  See infra note 20.  
 16. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (2018); IRM 
7.27.19 (Feb. 22, 1999); see infra Section I.C.  
 17. See, e.g., LISA NORTON, HOW TO BE A GLOBAL NONPROFIT: LEGAL AND 
PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 49 (2012) (“Expenditure 
responsibility can only be used when a grant is made for a specific, preapproved 
project.”); see also JODY BLAZEK, TAX PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE FOR TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 492 (5th ed. 2012) (noting that grant terms must “clearly 
state the purpose for the grant”). 
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I.  PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 
Part I provides an overview of private foundations, including what 
foundations are, their role in society, and how they foster change 
through grant making.  Part I then proceeds to explain the basic types 
of grants that foundations can provide before exploring the particular 
legal framework that governs grant making to international 
organizations. 
A. Foundations and Their Role in Civil Society 
A private foundation is a tax-exempt organization established for a 
charitable purpose, generally by one person or family with a large 
amount of wealth.18  Foundations seek to foster change in the world 
and wield their influence through the disbursement of funds to other 
organizations or individuals with a deep commitment to and expertise 
in the chosen area of concern.19  Charitable purposes are any 
activities that seek to provide: 
relief of the poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged; 
advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; 
erecting or maintaining public buildings, monuments, or works; 
lessening the burdens of government; lessening neighborhood 
tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination; defending human 
and civil rights secured by law; and combating community 
deterioration and juvenile delinquency.20 
Along the same lines, foundations are not allowed to engage in 
lobbying activities or political campaigns.21  Put simply, being 
charitable means that an organization is serving a “public rather than 
a private interest.”22 
Foundations are regulated by the IRS and must follow relevant 
aspects of the U.S. Tax Code, the Code of Federal Regulations (the 
“C.F.R.”), and a series of IRS guidelines shared in the Internal 
                                                                                                                                      
 18. See Foundation Basics, COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, 
http://www.cof.org/content/foundation-basics#what_is_a_foundation 
[https://perma.cc/E6TC-PTYU]. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Exempt Purposes – Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-
organizations/exempt-purposes-internal-revenue-code-section-501c3 
[https://perma.cc/P59M-FQ2C]. 
 21. See 26 U.S.C. § 4945(d) (2014). 
 22. MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 107 (4th ed. 2013); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). 
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Revenue Manual (the “I.R.M.”).23  Given the positive potential 
impact of foundations, the U.S. government has incentivized the 
creation of and donation to foundations by making those 
contributions tax deductible.24  There is contradictory evidence about 
whether or not the tax deductible nature of donations has a positive, 
neutral, or even negative impact on the amount of donations made to 
foundations;25 however, tax deductibility is generally seen as a 
positive incentive.26  For existing foundations, tax-exempt status is 
generally viewed as crucial to their long-term survival; therefore, 
foundations have every incentive to adhere to the IRS regulations 
governing how their tax deductible dollars can be spent in order to 
retain their tax-exempt status.27 
Private foundations have played—and continue to play—a key role 
in civil society, providing resources for underfunded interests and 
innovation, pushing the status quo, and supporting a diversity of 
viewpoints in society at-large.28  By virtue of their concentrated 
wealth, foundations hold a nearly unmatched ability to channel 
resources towards the provision of crucial support and services in 
sectors where the government cannot or chooses not to provide 
support.29  In fact, this ability to fill the gaps left by the government is 
often recognized as the justification for providing foundations with 
tax exemption.30 
                                                                                                                                      
 23. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 4945(d) (2014); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (2015); IRM  
7.27.19 (Feb. 22, 1999). 
 24. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). 
 25. See RANDALL G. HOLCOMBE, WRITING OFF IDEAS: TAXATION, 
FOUNDATIONS, AND PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA 87 (1st ed. 2000) (“. . . the tax 
system has the potential to exert a significant influence on the resources that flow 
into the nonprofit sector of the economy, although predictions that if tax deductibility 
of contributions were eliminated the sector would lose most of its funding are likely 
to be overstated.”). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. E.g., Barry Gaberman, The Role of Foundations in Society, ALLIANCE MAG., 
Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.alliancemagazine.org/article/the-role-of-foundations-in-
society/ [https://perma.cc/R97M-LC68]; JOAN E. SPERO, FOUNDATION CENTER, THE 
GLOBAL ROLE OF U.S. FOUNDATIONS 33 (2010), 
http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/global_role_of_us_foundatio
ns.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WVF-U6S6] (“What foundations can do is to identify gaps, 
needs, and niches where their resources can contribute to pieces of the problem, to 
aspects of social, economic, and political change . . . ”); Carl Schramm, Law Outside 
the Market: The Social Utility of Private Foundations, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
355, 358–62 (2006). 
 29. See HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 2. 
 30. See SANDERS, supra note 22, at 102 n.299 (“[T]he exemption from taxation of 
money or property devoted to charitable or other purposes is based upon the theory 
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Foundations also resource innovation, fostering important strides 
in social progress by funding thinkers, innovators, and social pioneers 
in fields ranging from medicine to the arts.  Funding “laboratories” of 
experimentation, foundations can help find solutions to some of 
society’s biggest challenges that, once found, can then be outsourced 
to the government or other service providers who cannot afford to 
undertake such experimentation themselves.31  Andrew Carnegie—
forefather of one of the most prominent modern-day foundations—is 
credited with the provocative quote that “wealth, passing through the 
hands of the few, can be made a much more potent force for the 
elevation of our race than if it had been distributed in small sums to 
the people themselves.”32  Though controversial, this statement does 
illustrate the potency with which foundations can contribute to the 
broader public good. 
There are many examples of the impact that foundations have 
made on particular issues, in particular fields and movements, and in 
the world, generally.  For example, the Kellogg Foundation, an 
institution that provides higher education for roughly ten million 
students per year, was an initial funder of community colleges in the 
United States.33  In the field of public health, foundations such as the 
Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation have provided 
AIDS medication to tens of thousands of individuals, funded public 
education campaigns that have focused on awareness of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, and supported public-private partnerships to 
search for a vaccine to the disease.34  Foundations can also play a 
crucial role in global politics: through funding the building of libraries 
in the former Soviet Union, the Open Society Foundations helped 
                                                                                                                                      
that the government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial 
burdens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public 
funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.”). 
 31. See Schramm, supra note 28; see also HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 28 
(discussing foundations’ ability to examine the causes of problems rather than simply 
attempting to treat the problem). 
 32. Christopher Caldwell, Donor Beware: The New Realities of Philanthropy, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donor-beware-the-new-
realities-of-philanthropy-1457721449 [https://perma.cc/6VHS-46DG]. 
 33. See Foundation Growth, W.K. KELLOGG FOUNDATION, 
https://www.wkkf.org/who-we-are/history-legacy [https://perma.cc/D83R-L2YZ]. 
 34. See HIV Strategy Overview, GATES FOUNDATION, 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Health/HIV 
[https://perma.cc/5FPC-DM27]; HIV/AIDS, ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATIONS, 
https://rockfound.rockarch.org/hiv/aids [https://perma.cc/VMF3-F9E4]. 
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bolster people’s movements that ultimately led to the fall of the 
Soviet regime.35 
On the other hand, the same concentration of wealth that allows 
private foundations to have the impact described above is also why 
private foundations have been the target of continuous skepticism 
since their inception.  The impetus for this skepticism is two-fold.  
First, foundations are financially independent in that they generally 
have one individual or family of donors who provide their funding.36  
By placing those funds into an endowment, the funds become self-
sustaining over time with little room for regulation.37  Second, and 
related to the first issue, private foundations are broadly perceived to 
lack accountability.38  Many charitable organizations are perceived as 
accountable to the public because the organization relies on the 
general public to be its donors; therefore, in order to ensure 
continued funding, organizations shift their strategies to remain 
consistent with what the public believes is the best use of charitable 
assets.39  In contrast, foundations are financially independent; 
therefore, they are not subject to the same pressure to alter their 
strategies to the public’s preferences and could, ostensibly, undertake 
activities in the name of the public good that the public, themselves, 
do not desire.40 
B. Foundation Grant Making 
The main tool through which private foundations seek to foster 
social change is through the disbursement of funds to organizations 
and individuals through a mechanism called a grant.  Grants are 
                                                                                                                                      
 35. See About Us, History, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/history [https://perma.cc/44EY-
VYPM]. 
 36. See Foundation Basics, supra note 18. 
 37. See HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 2 (“Foundations become wealthier and 
wealthier, and continue to undertake expenditures to further their visions of the 
public good.”). 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 3 (“The perceived problems stem from the fact that a small 
group of foundation trustees are able to control a substantial amount of money that 
can have an impact on political and social policy without being accountable to anyone 
for their actions.  The money is not theirs.  It was earned by others who, for the most 
part, have long been dead.  Now control of these fortunes has been given to a group 
of unelected and unrepresentative trustees.”). 
 39. See generally NORTON, supra note 17, at 43–44. 
 40. See, e.g., HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 2 (“The primary problem from a 
public policy standpoint is that foundation trustees have a tremendous amount of 
wealth at their disposal that they can spend as they see fit.  While they are charged 
with acting in the public interest, they are accountable to nobody.”). 
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disbursements of funds—which can include loans, in-kind donations, 
and program-related investments—given to public charities; i.e., 
entities registered under section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Tax Code with 
a verified charitable purpose.41  Though it would be easy to think of 
grants as gifts, grants are, in fact, contracts: grantors make grants for 
particular purposes and do not tend to expect the funds ever to be 
returned.42 
Overall, grants fall into two legal categories: general support and 
project support.  In broad strokes, there are fewer restrictions and 
requirements tied to general support grants than project support 
grants, though the restrictions provided in a grant agreement can vary 
in depth for both types of grants.43  Put simply, the amount of 
autonomy a grantee has to determine how to spend grant funds is 
inversely proportional to the amount of specificity or restrictions that 
the grantor provides in the grant agreement.  The following sections 
will explore the particular nature of both of these types of grants. 
1. Project Support Grants 
Project support grants provide funds for specific, pre-determined 
projects or areas of work that have a timeline, budget, and discrete 
objectives.44  When a foundation is considering providing a project 
support grant to an organization, it solicits both narrative and 
financial proposals that outline the specifics for the work to be 
funded.45  The financial proposal must be tied to the proposed 
activities, and must exclude certain prohibited expenditures (e.g., 
lobbying activities, the purchase of capital equipment over a de 
minimis amount, or the funding of grants to individuals).46  In order 
                                                                                                                                      
 41. See 26 I.R.C. § 4945 (2014); 26 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018); FRANCES HILL & 
DOUGLAS MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 11-79 (2002–2009). 
 42. See, e.g., Grants Management 101, ROCKY MOUNTAIN PUBLIC HEALTH 
TRAINING CENTER (2015), http://www.grantsmanagement101.org/management-
basics.html [https://perma.cc/BL9N-EEX9]. 
 43. See generally Program Grants vs. Operating Support, AMPLIFIER, 
http://www.amplifiergiving.org/media/resources/Program_Grants_vs._General_Opera
ting_Support__including_8_Tips_for_Being_a_Good_Donor.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6QQA-9CCR]. 
 44. See, e.g., id. 
 45. See, e.g., id. 
 46. See 26 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).  Given the tax-exempt nature of foundation 
funds, the IRS has an established interest in how those funds are expended.  In the 
1960s, the misuse of certain foundation funds to both engage in political activities 
(specifically, the election of the first black mayor in Cleveland, Ohio) and to pay 
individuals (several Kennedy staffers were given payments to ease their transition out 
of the administration following the President’s death) prompted skepticism, and the 
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to show that funds were expended for acceptable purposes and in the 
spirit of what was outlined in the original proposal, project support 
grants require both narrative and financial reporting at their close, 
with an option for interim reporting throughout the grant term.47 
Project support grants are the more restrictive of the two types of 
grants,48 allowing donors to fund only those projects they are 
specifically interested in and, if they choose, to play a role in shaping 
those projects—both during the proposal and project implementation 
stages.  Funders do tend to remain significantly involved in the efforts 
they fund through project support grants, approving line-item shifts in 
the budget and providing advice on project approach and 
implementation.49  As project support grants allow funders to remain 
involved in how grant funds are expended, they are the more popular 
type of grant.50  In addition, though most grants are made to 501(c)(3) 
organizations, it is generally understood that project support grants 
can be made to organizations other than 501(c)(3) entities, because 
the specificity with which the grants are made allows funders to 
ensure that the activities the grant is supporting are in furtherance of 
a charitable purpose.51 
2. General Support Grants 
General support grants, in contrast to project support grants, 
provide a grantee with unrestricted funds that the grantee can 
determine how to expend.52  In other words, general support grant 
funds are not tied to particular projects, outcomes, or timelines 
dictated by the funder; instead, grantees can make determinations 
about how they can best utilize their funds, be it for an existing body 
of work, to develop a new body of work, to cover overhead costs, to 
support internal capacity-building efforts, or even to adjust the way 
                                                                                                                                      
eventual passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 92, 
94–96; H.R. Rep. No. 91-413 (1969); John R. Labovitz, The Impact of Private 
Foundation Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 63, 67 (1974).  
 47. See U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, I.R.S. Pub. No. 1771 (Rev. 3-2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1771.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GRJ-3JDK]. 
 48. See Program Grants vs. Operating Support, supra note 43. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See generally id. 
 51. See infra Section I.C. 
 52. See What Is General Operating Support and Why Is It Important?, 
GRANTMAKERS FOR EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS (May 29, 2014), 
https://www.geofunders.org/resources/what-is-general-operating-support-and-why-is-
it-important-678 [https://perma.cc/A275-UPVL ]. 
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funds are allocated mid-course in order to remain as responsive and 
effective as possible.53 
General support grants can be more legally complicated than 
project grants.  The same legal restrictions apply to general support 
grants as apply to project support grants—e.g., as noted above, 
foundations are not allowed to conduct nor support any lobbying or 
political activities—yet 501(c)(3) public charities are allowed to 
conduct or participate in a de minimis amount of those activities.54  
Logically, this presents a challenge for a foundation that wishes to 
provide a general support grant to a 501(c)(3) organization that 
conducts a de minimis amount of lobbying or political activity: 
Though the general support grant is supposed to provide the grantee 
with full flexibility to determine how the funds are expended, the 
foundation’s funds cannot technically support the grantee’s de 
minimis lobbying or political activities.  The IRS has responded to 
this potential challenge by creating a general support safe harbor that 
allows a foundation to provide a general support grant to a 501(c)(3) 
organization that conducts a de minimis amount of lobbying or 
political activity, provided the foundation remains completely hands-
off and does not earmark (or denote) funds for any particular 
purpose.55  If the foundation does require funds to be expended on 
particular projects or activities, they will lose the protection of the 
general support safe harbor; in that case, if the grantee ends up using 
those funds on lobbying in pursuit of those earmarked projects or 
activities, the foundation will face excise taxes and other potential 
penalties.56  In the alternative, if the foundation stays true to the 
notion of giving the grantee autonomy about how funds are spent, the 
IRS is willing to accept that money is fungible and will not punish the 
foundation for having supported an organization that conducts a de 
minimis amount of those otherwise prohibited activities.57  Therefore, 
in order to retain the legal safety of the safe harbor when making a 
general support grant, it is crucial that a foundation avoid both the 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. See, e.g., General Operating Support (or Unrestricted) Grants, supra note 12 
(discussing how general support allows grantees to “invest” in themselves by building 
capacity or investing in new areas of work); Unrestricted Core Support: 
Strengthening the Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12; The Beauty of 
the General Support Grant, supra note 10. 
 54. See Allocation of Costs to Lobbying Activities, 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-28(g) (1995). 
 55. See IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb. 22, 1999). 
 56. See id.; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (2015). 
 57. See IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb. 22, 1999); Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 
53.4945-5 (2015). 
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action and appearance of earmarking—or denoting—funds for 
particular purposes. 
There are three main ways that foundations approach general 
support grant making in order to stay within the confines of this 
general support safe harbor and, as a result, adhere to the intention of 
providing grantees with greater agency through the use of a general 
support grant.  The simplest way is to take a “blank check” 
approach.58  Through this approach, the foundation provides a grant 
without requiring a proposal or any follow-up reporting.59  With such 
sparse requirements, it is hard to generate the perception that the 
foundation is earmarking funds for any particular purpose.60  
However, this approach is also quite limiting: without insight into the 
work of a grantee organization, the grant maker has very little 
knowledge about the organization’s role in the field or how the 
foundation’s contribution aided its efforts.61  In addition, the 
foundation loses key insights into the field of interest.  Therefore, 
many funders prefer to have some higher level of engagement than 
this.62 
Even while staying within the confines of the general support safe 
harbor, the donor can have some basic conversations about the 
organization’s overall goals to ensure sufficient strategic alignment 
before providing funding.63  Therefore, a second approach to general 
support grant making can involve a proposal.  Rather than focusing 
on the project-level detail, however, the focus is on the overall 
organizational strategy and objectives.64  Often, a grantee uses its 
annual strategy document or action plan as the proposal.65  The 
foundation might have some conversations with the grantee, but such 
conversations focus only on the grantee’s organizational strategies 
and objectives, without indicating any clear preferences for how the 
grantee spends the funds.66  The grant agreement in this situation is 
                                                                                                                                      
 58. Interview with Nicole Campbell, Deputy General Counsel, Open Society 
Foundations, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 3, 2016). 
 59. Id. 
 60. As required by IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb. 22, 1999). 
 61. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See generally IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb. 22, 1999); What Is General Operating 
Support and Why Is It Important?, supra note 52 (“Despite the unrestricted nature of 
general operating support, providing it does not mean that grantmakers forfeit the 
ability to influence how grant dollars are spent or to track the outcomes of their 
investments.”). 
 64. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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also sufficiently broad, allowing the grantee to remain in control of 
how funds are spent and—as long as they remain within the spirit of 
their original proposal—to shift their work as new circumstances or 
opportunities arise.67  With regards to reporting, the grantee can 
report on any activities that were discussed in the original proposal 
(the foundation cannot request further information on any one 
particular project or body of work), and the organization can provide 
their overall income and expenditures for the year, as long as the 
foundation’s funds are not attributed to particular projects 
(attribution of the foundation funds to particular activities increases 
potential possibilities for or appearances of earmarking).68  
Ultimately, this second approach allows the foundation to have an 
understanding of what the grantee plans to do and what they have 
actually achieved (which is generally understood to be crucial 
information for a foundation), while not earmarking their funds for 
particular purposes.69  Yet this approach comes with greater risk than 
the “blank check” approach.  By engaging in conversation about 
grantee activities, the foundation is more at risk of appearing as if 
they earmarked funds for particular purposes.  This appearance of 
earmarking could become problematic if the grantee uses the funds 
on prohibited expenditures. 
Though the second option does provide a foundation with greater 
insight into—and opportunity to engage with—the grantee’s strategy, 
there are foundations that desire to have still more engagement in the 
work of the grantee, even when giving a general support grant.  
Therefore, there is a third potential approach, often referred to as 
“negotiated general support.”70  Through this approach, the 
foundation has clear conversations with the grantee about what 
specific projects the foundation wants to see the grantee undertake.71  
                                                                                                                                      
 67. IRM 7.27.19.6.14.1 (Feb. 22, 1999) (“[T]he mere use of grant funds for 
activities not planned in the original budget is not treated as a diversion.  The use of 
the grant funds must actually be inconsistent with the original purposes of the grant 
as described in the grant agreement.”). 
 68. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: General Operating Support (or 
Unrestricted) Grants, GRANTCRAFT (Feb. 18, 2015), 
http://www.grantcraft.org/casestudies/bill-and-melinda-gates-foundation 
[https://perma.cc/D33X-7UNX]; Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the 
Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12; What Is General Operating Support 
and Why Is It Important?, supra note 52. 
 71. See Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: General Operating Support (or 
Unrestricted) Grants, supra note 70; Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the 
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Though this does mean that the foundation is making its priorities 
clear to the grantee organization, a foundation may remain within the 
general support safe harbor by not requiring the grant funds to be 
spent on any one of the specific projects discussed during these 
conversations; instead, the grantee retains full control over how the 
funds are allocated.72  In other words, a negotiated general support 
approach de-links the way grant funds are expended from the projects 
or outcomes that a foundation is interested in a grantee pursuing.  
Reporting for negotiated general support grants generally must avoid 
attribution of foundation funds to particular activities, as well, in 
order to avoid the actual or perceived earmarking of funds for 
particular activities.73  Foundations are generally wary of this 
approach, however, because conversations with a grantee could easily 
be seen to express specific foundation interests in how they want 
grant money to be spent.74 
The challenge with general support grant making is that the 
grantee’s autonomy is inversely proportional to that of the granting 
foundation.75  Money is power to a foundation, and by choosing to 
cede control of how money is spent, the foundation is choosing to 
cede that influence as well.  Given that foundations determine the 
types of support they provide to grantees, this means that foundations 
must choose to relinquish a significant amount of control and 
influence over how the funds are expended, something foundations—
with their own theories of change, strategies, and internal 
accountability structures—naturally hesitate to do.76  Whether 
consciously or subconsciously, foundation staff members often feel 
that they do not have a sufficient level of trust with grantees to fully 
relinquish decision-making authority.77  Hurdles include concerns 
about grantee capacity to manage the funds or implement projects, 
but also go to foundations’ own ego and self-perception.78  Lastly, 
                                                                                                                                      
Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12; What Is General Operating Support 
and Why Is It Important?, supra note 52. 
 72. See Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: General Operating Support (or 
Unrestricted) Grants, supra note 70; Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the 
Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12; What Is General Operating Support 
and Why Is It Important?, supra note 52. See generally IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb. 
22,1999). 
 73. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., What Is General Operating Support and Why Is It Important?, supra 
note 52. 
 76. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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unless foundations use the “blank check” approach, foundations often 
perceive that general support grants are more legally risky than 
project support grants.79  For all of these reasons, general support 
grants make up less than one-third of all grants made each year across 
all foundations.80 
Despite these concerns, there is an increasingly accepted 
understanding in the philanthropic community that providing 
unrestricted funding to grantees is more effective than providing 
project grants.81  Given that grantees are generally much closer to and 
possess greater expertise on their issues of focus than donors, 
allowing grantees greater control over how grant funds are expended 
can result in much more effective and responsive programming.82  
The complex fields in which charitable organizations work are 
constantly evolving and changing: political opportunities appear and 
disappear, natural disasters occur suddenly, and the complex eco-
system that is civil society and public discourse changes in slight ways 
that make new approaches or strategies more effective than 
expected.83  These constant changes in the environment make it 
crucial for organizations to be able to adjust their projects in real-
time, adapting to the ever-evolving dynamics on the ground.  Not only 
is it more efficient for grantees to be able to make those decisions 
without having to receive prior approval from the donor, but this 
approach is also more responsive to the complexities of the real world 
and can lead to greater impact.84 
Allowing the grantee to remain in control of how funds are spent 
also is crucial for avoiding donor-driven agendas.  The altruism of 
donors is complicated, with only the most mature of donors giving for 
                                                                                                                                      
 79. See supra Section I.B.2. (“Yet this approach comes with greater risk than the 
‘blank check’ approach.  By engaging in conversation about grantee activities, the 
foundation is more at risk of appearing as if they have earmarked funds for particular 
purposes.  This appearance of earmarking could become problematic if the grantee 
uses the funds on prohibited expenditures.”). 
 80. See MCCRAY, supra note 10, at 7; see also infra Section II.D. 
 81. E.g., How Can We Be More Supportive of Nonprofit Financial 
Sustainability?, GRANTMAKERS FOR EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS (Mar. 5, 2014), 
https://www.geofunders.org/resources/how-can-we-be-more-supportive-of-nonprofit-
financial-sustainability-662 [https://perma.cc/C5WH-NVH7]; The Beauty of the 
General Support Grant, supra note 10. 
 82.  How Can We Be More Supportive of Nonprofit Financial Sustainability?, 
supra note 81; The Beauty of the General Support Grant, supra note 10. 
 83. E.g., The Beauty of the General Support Grant, supra note 10; Unrestricted 
Core Support: Strengthening the Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12. 
 84. The Beauty of the General Support Grant, supra note 10; Unrestricted Core 
Support: Strengthening the Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12. 
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reasons that truly focus on the beneficiary rather than being 
motivated by more personal motives, such as tax breaks, the desire to 
be remembered, or from a sense of guilt.85  Accordingly, most donors 
have particular ideas about the type of change they want to support 
or the specific types of projects they want implemented with their 
money.86  Unfortunately, due to their distance from the issues, 
communities, and the nuances involved with the issue at-hand, their 
interventions often result in misguided attempts at creating change.87  
Some of the most enlightening examples come from the field of 
international development, though these issues also arise in the civil 
and political realm.88 
General support also reduces the likelihood that a grantee will 
conduct activities solely because the donor desires them.89  Even 
when donors are giving for purely altruistic reasons, and would (at 
least theoretically) avoid the problems described above, grantees—in 
order to increase their chances of receiving future funding—will often 
attempt to anticipate what it is donors are looking for.90  Though this 
can still occur within the context of a general support grant, it is much 
less likely to happen when a foundation is having only high-level 
conversations with an organization, rather than the detailed 
                                                                                                                                      
 85. Roy Menninger, Foundation Work May be Hazardous to Your Mental 
Health: Some Occupational Dangers of Grant Making (and Grant Receiving) in 
GIVING WELL, DOING GOOD: READINGS FOR THOUGHTFUL PHILANTHROPISTS 129 
(Amy A. Kass ed., 1981) (“Reasons for giving come from several sources.  They’re 
not always conscious; one can discern, if one looks carefully, several lower levels of 
motivation even in the most altruistic acts of giving.  The first level if the narcissistic 
level.  A donor gives money for honor and glory — for the name on the 
building . . . The second level of giving is moralistic and conscience driven, with guilt 
as the motivation . . . . The third level — which might be described as the most 
mature form of giving — is [focused on] the other, the recipient; not the self, the 
giver . . .  [G]iving is never pure.  The most altruistic and most noble giving also 
contains elements of narcissism and guilt . . . .”). 
 86. See, e.g., Michael Hobbes, Stop Trying to Save the World, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Nov. 17, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/120178/problem-international-
development-and-plan-fix-it [https://perma.cc/U5TR-TP5V]. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the Capacity of Our Nonprofit 
Sector, supra note 12 (“If our goal is to help organizations become stronger and, 
therefore, more effective, we need nonprofits to tell us what they need – not what 
they think we want to hear.  And then we must have the willingness to be responsive 
and provide the flexible and long-term funding needed to build strong organizations 
and deliver effective programs.”). 
 90. Id. 
1312 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
conversations that can occur within the context of a project support 
grant.91 
Lastly, general support grants help organizations to develop.92  
When an organization receives fully restricted funding, they are not 
able to move funds around as new situations arise or new needs 
develop.93  Though an organization might have enough funding to 
cover their projects and (ideally) the associated core costs, they may 
not have funds to, for example, purchase new financial software, send 
their staff to relevant training, fund a search committee for a pending 
leadership transition, or even have the flexibility to undertake a new 
project if a window of unforeseen opportunity arises.94  With a 
general support grant, the grantee organization has that helpful 
flexibility, and is able to use the funds the way they need to use them 
the most.95  This bolsters the ability of the organization’s leadership to 
respond appropriately to the organization’s most pressing needs.96 
C. Grant Making to International Organizations: The Expenditure 
Responsibility Requirements 
As described above, foundations are allowed to use their tax-
exempt funds to provide either project support or general support to 
organizations defined as charitable by section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. 
Tax Code.97  However, there are many organizations that fall outside 
of this categorization, including certain domestic organizations—such 
as neighborhood organizations, public hospitals, and housing 
developments—as well as the majority of foreign-based 
                                                                                                                                      
 91. Id. 
 92. E.g., How Can We Be More Supportive of Nonprofit Financial 
Sustainability?, supra note 81; How Do We Know if a Grantee Is a Good Candidate 
for General Operating Support?, GRANTMAKERS FOR EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS 
(July 15, 2014), https://www.geofunders.org/resources/how-do-we-know-if-a-grantee-
is-a-good-candidate-for-general-operating-support-652 [https://perma.cc/9N72-
XXV5]; Support Nonprofit Resilience, GRANTMAKERS FOR EFFECTIVE 
ORGANIZATIONS, http://www.geofunders.org/smarter-grantmaking/nonprofit-
resilience/financial-sustainability [https://perma.cc/8VYV-B7WE]; Anna Pond, 
Supporting Grantee Capacity: Strengthening Effectiveness Together, GRANTCRAFT 
(2015), at 6, 
http://www.grantcraft.org/assets/content/resources/guide_capacity_interactive.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WC2Z-CWPR]; What Is General Operating Support and Why Is It 
Important?, supra note 52. 
 93. What Is General Operating Support and Why Is It Important?, supra note 52. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 3–4. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014). 
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organizations.98  The IRS does make it possible to fund the charitable 
activities of these organizations with tax-exempt dollars, but 
alternative regulations govern and change the nature of the types of 
grants (e.g., project support or general support) that a foundation can 
provide.99 
In fact, there are two procedures through which foundations can 
approach grant making in this context: equivalency determination or 
expenditure responsibility.  Equivalency determination is the process 
through which a foundation deems an organization to be the 
equivalent of a 501(c)(3).100  Expenditure responsibility is the process 
through which a foundation ensures that grant funds are spent on 
only those activities that a 501(c)(3) organization can conduct.101   
Though there are benefits and detriments to both approaches, both 
options serve to assure the IRS that tax-exempt foundation dollars 
are being used to support charitable activities only. 
First, through an equivalency determination, a foundation or 
qualified external tax expert determines102 that a foreign organization 
is the equivalent of a U.S. 501(c)(3) organization.103  An organization 
                                                                                                                                      
 98. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); see also Charitable, 
etc. Contributions and Gifts, 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2017). 
 99. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to 
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(a)(1) (2015). 
 100. “Equivalency determination (ED) is a process by which a U.S. grantmaker 
evaluates whether an intended foreign grantee is the equivalent of a U.S. public 
charity.  The grant maker must collect a set of detailed information about the 
grantee’s operations and finances and make a reasonable determination of its 
equivalency.” See What Is Equivalency Determination, NGO SOURCE, 
http://www.ngosource.org/how-it-works/what-is-equivalency-determination 
[https://perma.cc/VL26-ABWH]. 
 101. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to 
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(a)(1) (2015); IRM. 7.27.19 (Feb. 22, 1999). 
 102. Foundations can make this determination themselves, on the advice of 
counsel.  The rigidity of the requirements makes foundations confident in their 
determinations.  Alternatively, foundations can use an outside provider to make 
equivalency determinations, such as NGO Source. See NGO SOURCE, 
http://www.ngosource.org/ [https://perma.cc/P77F-CQMU]. 
 103. Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-2 CB 507 (superseded by Rev. Proc. 2017-53); see What 
Is Equivalency Determination, supra note 100; see also Betsy Adler & Stephanie 
Petit, Equivalency or Expenditure Responsibility? A Guide in Plain English, 73 
INTERNATIONAL DATELINE (2005), https://www.adlercolvin.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/Legal-Dimension-Equivalency-or-Expenditure-
Responsibility-00069171xA3536.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWZ4-2WSP]; see generally 
Stephanie L. Petit, IRS Releases Revenue Procedure 2017-53 on Foreign Public 
Charity Equivalency Determinations., ADLER & COLVIN BLOG (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://www.adlercolvin.com/blog/2017/09/15/irs-releases-revenue-procedure-2017-53-
on-foreign-public-charity-equivalence-determinations/ [PERMA] (explaining that 
Rev. Proc. 2017 modifies and supersedes Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-2 CB 507). 
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can be deemed the equivalent of a U.S. 501(c)(3) if it meets a series of 
tests that align with the 501(c)(3) requirements, including having a 
diversity of funding sources, meeting minimum distribution 
requirements, adhering to regulations on self-dealing, and conducting 
charitable activities.104  Once a foundation considers the organization 
to be an equivalent, an organization can be treated just as any other 
501(c)(3) organization and can receive both project support and 
general support grants with tax-exempt funds.105  This makes grant 
making quite easy; therefore, equivalency determination is generally 
considered more favorable than expenditure responsibility.106  
Despite this favorability, however, many organizations cannot achieve 
equivalency determination.107  Equivalency determination is difficult 
to achieve for a variety of reasons, including language barriers, 
paperwork/accounting requirements, the time that the process takes, 
or the variety of sources from which an organization receives its 
funding.108  When equivalency determination is not possible, 
foundations must turn to expenditure responsibility in order to make 
grants using their tax-exempt funds. 
Expenditure responsibility is the second alternative for how a 
foundation can provide funding to an organization that is not a 
501(c)(3) public charity (or equivalent), yet still retain the tax-exempt 
status for the grant funds.109  Like equivalency determination, the 
purpose of expenditure responsibility is to ensure that U.S. money 
being donated abroad (or to any other organization that is not 
registered as charitable) is used for approved, exempt purposes.110  
However, rather than focusing on the overall nature of the 
organization as a whole—as equivalency determination does—
                                                                                                                                      
 104. Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-2 CB 507 (superseded by Rev. Proc. 2017-53). See 
What Is Equivalency Determination, supra note 100; see also Adler & Petit, supra 
note 103. 
 105. Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-2 CB 507 (superseded by Rev. Proc. 2017-53). See 
What Is Equivalency Determination, supra note 100; see also Adler & Petit, supra 
note 103. 
 106. See supra Section I.C. 
 107. See generally BLAZEK, supra note 17, at 485 (“[S]eeking the appropriate 
information described in the preceding subsection from a foreign organization is not 
so simple and is often troublesome due to language, currency, and legal differences.  
Because of these difficulties, a private foundation will sometimes find it more 
comfortable to treat such foreign grantees as expenditure responsibility grants to 
avoid unexpected results.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to 
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(a)(1) (2015); IRM 7.27.19 (Feb. 22,1999). 
 110. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to 
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(1) (2015). 
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expenditure responsibility looks to the charitable nature of the 
specific activities that are being funded with exempt dollars.111 
The expenditure responsibility requirements are laid out in 26 
U.S.C. § 4945.112  In order to satisfy the expenditure responsibility 
requirements, foundations must adhere to a variety of rules that 
govern how they can make each expenditure responsibility grant to 
help ensure that grant funds will be used for charitable activities only.  
The generally accepted legal interpretation of the statute provides 
that a foundation must:113 
1. Conduct a pre-grant inquiry to ensure that a grantee organization 
is capable of adhering to the expenditure responsibility restrictions 
on grant funds;114 
2. Require a written grant proposal and written grant agreement 
that documents permissible and restricted uses for grant funds;115 
3. Meet a series of reporting requirements to document proper use 
of grant funds;116 and 
4. Disclose grant information annually to the IRS through the 
foundation’s tax filings.117 
5. If the grantee fails to adhere to the expenditure responsibility 
requirements, the foundation must take action to remedy the misuse 
of funds.118 
In sum, these requirements are generally interpreted to be quite 
arduous and require a high level of specificity from the grantee, both 
                                                                                                                                      
 111. General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, BLUEBOOK 3; SANDERS, 
supra note 22, at 102. 
 112. See Appendix A for the full statute. 
 113. E.g., Expenditure Responsibility Rules for Private Foundations, LEARN 
FOUNDATION LAW, http://learnfoundationlaw.org/transcript/expenditure-
responsibility-rules-for-private-foundations-course-transcript/ 
[https://perma.cc/L6XA-5Q3Z]; see also HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-80 to 
11-89; Robert Wexler, Expenditure Responsibility—A Primer and Ten Puzzling 
Problems, ADLER & COLVIN (Sept. 2010), https://www.adlercolvin.com/wp-
content/themes/adlercolvin/pdf/Expenditure-Responsibility-A-Primer-and-Ten-
Puzzling-Problems.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8NM-LZV5]. 
 114. See Wexler, supra note 113; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. 
§ 53.4945-5(b)(2) (2015). 
 115. See Wexler, supra note 113; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. 
§ 53.4945-5(b)(3) (2015). 
 116. See Wexler, supra note 113; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. 
§ 53.4945-5(c) (2015). 
 117. See Wexler, supra note 113; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. 
§ 53.4945-5(d) (2015). 
 118. See Wexler, supra note 113; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. 
§ 53.4945-5(e) (2015); HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-90; Expenditure 
Responsibility Rules for Private Foundations, supra note 113. 
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of which require time and capacity.119  The next few paragraphs will 
explore each of these five requirements in greater depth. 
1. Pre-Grant Inquiry 
A pre-grant inquiry (“PGI”) is required under expenditure 
responsibility in order to ensure that the recipient organization is—to 
the best of the foundation’s judgment—able to adhere to the terms of 
the grant agreement.  This determination is based upon a reasonable 
person standard; in other words, the depth of a PGI must be what a 
reasonable person would consider appropriate given the 
circumstances.120  Some factors that can be considered to determine 
what is reasonable include the size of the grantee organization, the 
size of the grant, the type of activities in which they are involved, the 
length of time that the foundation has known the organization, and 
the amount of experience of the organization in managing 
expenditure responsibility grants in the past.121  Though, in some 
cases, past experience of the grantee organization can alone be 
considered sufficient to fulfill the PGI requirements without any 
further inquiry, most foundations conduct their own PGIs for each 
expenditure responsibility grant. 122  An expenditure responsibility 
grant can be made to a new organization, as long as foundation 
leadership is sufficiently confident, based on the PGI, that the grantee 
organization is capable of managing—and will comply with—the 
expenditure responsibility requirements.123 
2. Written Grant Proposal and Written Grant Agreement 
A second requirement under expenditure responsibility is that of 
written grant proposals and agreements.124  The written proposal 
submitted by the grantee to the foundation must include the purpose 
                                                                                                                                      
 119. E.g., Donald Vacin, Guidelines for Foundation Administration Under the Tax 
Reform Act, 52 TAXES 277, 293 (1974) (“[T]he requirements for exercising 
expenditure responsibility are onerous, and failure to meet them can subject the 
Foundation and its managers to the section 4945 penalties.”). 
 120. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(2) (2015) (observing 
that the PGI will “vary from case to case depending upon the size and purpose of the 
grant,” as well as the grant term and the organization’s prior experience with 
expenditure responsibility requirements); HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-82 
(noting that the PGI “should be complete enough to meet the reasonable-person 
standard that the grant will be used for the proper purposes”). 
 121. E.g., HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-82. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. at 11-83. 
 124. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(3) (2015). 
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of the grant; the promise to repay unspent funds; and a commitment 
to submit annual reports, record expenditures, and to use funds only 
for acceptable, charitable purposes.125  An expenditure responsibility 
grant cannot be used to cover the expenses for certain prohibited 
activities, including lobbying, capital equipment purchases,126 or 
grants to individuals127; therefore, if the organization proposes to 
conduct prohibited activities, the proposal must also specify how 
those activities are being funded by sources other than the 
expenditure responsibility grant.128  Ultimately, the proposal can then 
serve as the basis for what must be a signed grant agreement between 
the grantee organization and the foundation. 
3. Reporting Requirements 
Expenditure responsibility also requires the grantee to write a 
financial and narrative report at the end of every grant term.129  The 
narrative report must explain how grant funds were applied towards 
specific projects or efforts, in a manner sufficient to confirm that 
funds were not spent on any prohibited expenditures.130  In addition, 
the narrative report must describe how the organization made 
progress towards the objectives outlined in the original proposal; 
though it is acceptable if the final activities do not align exactly with 
the initial proposal, the activities conducted must remain in alignment 
with the spirit of the original proposal and not attribute the funding of 
                                                                                                                                      
 125. E.g., HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-83 to 11-84. 
 126. In truth, this is actually a little more complicated.  Capital equipment can 
actually be purchased with funds from an ER grant, as long as the equipment is used 
for approved purposes (e.g., non-lobbying activities).  In order to ensure that the 
equipment is being used in the appropriate manner, grantees must report on the 
equipment for at least two years, and perhaps longer if it is unclear whether the 
equipment might be used to help further lobbying activities in the future.  Given this 
reporting requirement, most foundations choose not to fund any capital purchases 
above a de minimis threshold with funds that come with ER restrictions. See Grants 
to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)(2) (2015). 
 127. See Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to 
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(e) (2015). 
 128. See 26 C.F.R. Sxn 53.4945 (b)(3)(iv). 
 129. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)(1) (2015). 
 130. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-86 (“[T]he regulations generally 
require that the reports show the use of the funds, compliance with the terms of the 
grant, and the progress made by the grantee toward achieving the purposes for which 
the grant was made.”).  Referring back to a more detailed description of a project 
provided in a proposal can be sufficient, as long as implementation mirrored the 
proposal. Id.  
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any prohibited activities to the expenditure responsibility grant.131  
Similarly, the financial reports must outline how grant funds were 
spent as a way to ensure that no funds were used for lobbying or 
other prohibited expenditures, as demonstrated in the sample report 
in Appendix B.132  A financial report must be submitted at the end of 
any fiscal period in which a grantee receives expenditure 
responsibility funds from a foundation.133  Therefore, if a grant spans 
multiple fiscal years, the grantee organization must submit a financial 
report at the end of each fiscal year, as well as at the end of the 
project when the grantee has expended all funds.134  The foundation 
can request or mandate further narrative and/or financial reporting if 
included in the signed grant agreement.135  If grant funds remain 
following the completion of the agreed-upon grant activities, the 
grantee organization must continue to submit reports either until all 
funds are expended or any funds remaining are returned, as a way to 
confirm that funds were expended for acceptable purposes only.136 
4. Disclosure of Grant Information 
The final expenditure responsibility requirements cover mandatory 
disclosure to the IRS.137  As with all grants, foundations are obligated 
to disclose to the IRS any expenditure responsibility grants they make 
each year in their annual tax filings; in addition, a foundation must 
have all related documentation on-file, ready to be accessed in case of 
audit.138  The IRS tends to interpret this requirement strictly.139 
                                                                                                                                      
 131. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-90 (“[A] diversion of grant funds 
involves more than merely using the funds for a purpose different from that indicated 
in the grant’s original budget projection; the use must actually be inconsistent with 
the original purposes of the grant as described in the grant agreement.”). 
 132. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)(1) (2015).  See 
Appendix B for a sample financial report. 
 133. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-86. 
 134. See id. 
 135. 26 C.F.R. Sxn 53.4945 (c)(1); Adler & Petit, supra note 103. 
 136. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)(1) (2015). 
 137. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(d)(1) (2015). 
 138. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(d)(3) (2015); see also HILL 
& MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-87, 11-89. 
 139. E.g., HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-88 to 11-89 (explaining that even 
corrected tax returns sometimes are not considered sufficient to be in compliance 
with the expenditure responsibility disclosure requirements). 
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5. Taking Action to Remedy the Misuse of Funds 
If a foundation fails to adhere to the expenditure responsibility 
standards, there are a series of potential penalties with varying levels 
of severity.  Generally, any grant for which the foundation does not 
meet the requirements will be treated as a taxable expenditure.140  
Excise taxes will then be charged to the foundation managers, as a 
way of increasing individual accountability.141  If the failure to comply 
with expenditure responsibility requirements continues significantly 
over time, the IRS can revoke a foundation’s tax-exempt status.142 
Despite this responsibility, the provision of an expenditure 
responsibility grant does not mean that a foundation becomes 
responsible for the grantee’s every action.143  It is the expectation that 
a foundation will exercise its judgment about when it is or is not 
appropriate to make an expenditure responsibility grant, conduct an 
appropriate level of due diligence, and make its best effort to ensure 
compliance with the relevant code and regulations.  As long as the 
foundation made a reasonable determination that the grantee would 
adhere to the expenditure responsibility requirements, a foundation is 
not the “insurer of the activity of the organization to which it makes a 
grant.”144  A foundation is allowed to accept statements made in 
reports as true, unless it has reason to doubt their authenticity.145  If 
the grantee fails to live up to all of the requirements—such as failing 
to submit a required report or failing to return funds spent for 
unacceptable purposes under the expenditure responsibility 
framework—the foundation will not be penalized as long as the 
                                                                                                                                      
 140. See Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to 
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(e) (2015). 
 141. See Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014). 
 142. See How to Lose Your Tax Exempt Status (Without Really Trying), IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/How%20to%20Lose%20Your%20Tax%20Exempt%20Status.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3NCS-SRXM]. 
 143. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(1) (2015) (clarifying 
that foundations are not “an insurer of the activity of the organization to which it 
makes a grant”); S. Rep. No. 91-552, at 2078 (1969) (noting that expenditure 
responsibility does not make a “granting foundation an insurer of the activity of the 
organization to which it makes a grant, so long as it uses reasonable efforts and 
establishes adequate procedures so that the funds will be used for proper charitable 
purposes”). 
 144. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(1) (2015); S. Rep. No. 
91-552, at 2078 (1969). 
 145. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-87 (“[T]he grantor private 
Foundation generally may rely on the reports submitted by a grantee and is not 
required to conduct any independent verification of the grantees reports unless it has 
reason to doubt their accuracy or reliability.”). 
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foundation itself takes “reasonable and appropriate” remedial steps, 
such as disclosing the grant to the IRS and withholding any future 
payments or grants to the organization until they have come fully into 
compliance with the expenditure responsibility requirements.146 
The expenditure responsibility requirements generally are 
interpreted to be arduous and present risk, for either general or 
project support grants.147  Given the potential negative impact that 
failing to adhere to the expenditure responsibility requirements can 
create for a foundation, foundation managers and counsel tend to 
interpret the requirements strictly, in a risk-averse manner, in order 
to ensure compliance with the law, thereby avoiding potential 
sanctions or loss of tax-exempt status.148  As a result, these codes and 
regulations affect foundation behavior by creating a number of 
disincentives that were not necessarily the intent of the law and 
related regulations; this includes an increased reliance on lawyers, 
given the complexity of the law and the associated risks, and a general 
avoidance of funding non-501(c)(3) organizations, small grants, or 
new organizations altogether.149  This interpretation of the limitations 
and burdens of the expenditure responsibility requirements is further 
explored and dissected in the coming sections. 
II.  FOUNDATION RELUCTANCE TO MAKE GENERAL SUPPORT 
GRANTS WHILE OPERATING UNDER EXPENDITURE 
RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
The regulations governing expenditure responsibility expressly 
state that it is possible to make a general support grant within the 
confines of expenditure responsibility,150 yet legal interpretation and 
foundation practice consistently emphasize the use of project grants 
alone when working under the expenditure responsibility 
requirements.151  Section II.A reviews the governing portion of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 146. See id. But see SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS 
AND MEANS, 98th Cong., DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AND CONTINUING LEGAL 
ISSUES IN THE TAX TREATMENT OF PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 32 (Comm. Print 1983) 
(specifying that expenditure responsibility “requires grant-making foundations to 
assume the responsibility that their grantees will use their grants properly”); 
Labovitz, supra note 46, at 83. 
 147. See infra Section II.B. 
 148. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(e) (2015). 
 149. E.g., Labovitz, supra note 46, at 82; SANDERS, supra note 22, at 1268. 
 150. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(3) (2015). 
 151. E.g., Expenditure Responsibility Rules for Private Foundations, supra note 
113. 
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U.S. Tax Code,152 the C.F.R.,153 the I.R.M.,154 and the related 
legislative history, to explain the ways in which general support grants 
seem to be an acceptable option under the expenditure responsibility 
requirements.  Section II.B explores foundation practice as it relates 
to expenditure responsibility implementation, and then Section II.C 
reviews the policy debate about whether the use of general support 
should or should not increase. 
A. The United States Code, Code of Federal Regulations, and 
the Internal Revenue Manual: The Explicit Mention of 
“General Support” 
Section 4945 of United States Code Title 26 addresses expenditure 
responsibility.155  Its language is fairly general and sufficiently vague, 
framing expenditure responsibility as a positive exception to the rules 
governing the taxation of foundation expenditures to non-exempt 
organizations.156  The only requirements are that a foundation is 
obligated “(1) to see that the grant is spent solely for the purpose for 
which [it is] made, (2) to obtain full and complete reports from the 
grantee on how the funds are spent, and (3) to make full and detailed 
reports with respect to such expenditures to the Secretary.”157  There 
is no mention of the types of grants that foundations can or cannot 
make while maintaining compliance with these requirements; in other 
words, while this portion of the Code does not state affirmatively that 
general support grants are allowed, neither does it state that general 
support grants are prohibited. 
A more nuanced and interesting picture of what expenditure 
responsibility actually means only begins to form when examining the 
relevant portion of the C.F.R.: 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5.  Where the U.S. 
Code remains vague, the C.F.R. begins to provide more specifics.  For 
example, it is in this part of the Code that many of the specific 
                                                                                                                                      
 152. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4940– 4948 (2014). 
 153. See generally Purposes 1 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2010).  
 154. A reference guide for tax authorities. See generally IRM 1.1.1.1 (June 2, 
2015). 
 155. Expenditure responsibility was first introduced in The Tax Reform Act of 
1969, a law that perhaps “has done more to influence modern philanthropy” than any 
other law before or since. See Peter Frumkin, The Ironies of Foundation Regulation, 
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Feb. 5, 2004), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/The-
Ironies-of-Foundation/164851?cid=cpfd_home [https://perma.cc/UPW3-5FPH]. See 
also HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 1 (“[T]he 1969 tax reform was the biggest public 
policy change ever undertaken with regard to America’s nonprofit Foundations.”). 
 156. See 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014). 
 157. Id. § 4945(h)(1)-(3). 
1322 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
expenditure responsibility requirements are first introduced, such as 
the requirements for a pre-grant inquiry, written and signed grant 
agreement, and to repay any unused or misused funds; in addition, 
this section of the C.F.R. further elaborates on the reporting 
requirements.158 
Most importantly, general support is explicitly mentioned in the 
C.F.R.: the grant agreement: 
must also clearly specify the purposes of the grant.  Such purposes 
may include contributing for capital endowment, for the purchase of 
capital equipment, or for general support provided that neither the 
grants nor the income therefrom may be used for purposes other 
than those described in section 170(c)(2)(B).159 
Unfortunately, despite this express mention of general support, no 
further guidance is provided in the C.F.R. about how a foundation 
might make a general support grant under expenditure 
responsibility.160  The same holds true for the I.R.M., in which certain 
details are further delineated regarding how expenditure 
responsibility grants might look, yet further guidance is not provided 
about how general support grants might be made.161 
The policy purposes behind expenditure responsibility also support 
the idea that general support is allowed within the confines of 
expenditure responsibility.  The legislative history uncovers that the 
purpose of expenditure responsibility is to ensure that funds donated 
to foreign organizations are used to promote the public good, just as 
funds donated to 501(c)(3) organizations or their equivalents would 
be limited.162  As stated in the C.F.R., expenditure responsibility is 
intended to “impose[] restrictions on the use of the grant substantially 
equivalent to the limitations imposed on a domestic private 
foundation under section 4945(d),” but not to go any further.163  The 
key is to balance flexibility with responsibility.164  General support 
grants are allowed to public charities and their equivalents; therefore, 
                                                                                                                                      
 158. See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (2015). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See IRM7.27.19.3.11, 6.1, 6.7 (Feb. 22, 1999). 
 162. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, at 1648 (1969) (observing that expenditure 
responsibility intends “to prevent self-dealing between the foundations and their 
substantial contributors, to require the distribution of income for charitable purposes, 
to limit their holdings of private businesses, to give assurance that their activities are 
restricted as provided by the exemption provisions of the tax laws, and to be sure that 
investments of these organizations are not jeopardized by financial speculation.”). 
 163. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(5) (2015). 
 164. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, at 1680 (1969). 
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in order to maintain this equity and balance, Congress likely intended 
that they be allowed in the expenditure responsibility context as 
well.165 
The way that expenditure responsibility is framed—as an exception 
to otherwise taxable expenditures—also seems to promote the notion 
that the requirements should have some associated flexibility.166  By 
consequence, expenditure responsibility appears to be an avenue for 
providing greater breadth and flexibility for foundations in their grant 
making.  The expenditure responsibility requirements also inherently 
afford a significant level of discretion to foundations.167  Rather than 
focusing on what a grantee must do, the expenditure responsibility 
requirements provide clarity about what a grantee must not do.168  
The prohibitions limit lobbying and other political activity, capital 
equipment purchases and individual grant making; beyond that, 
grantees are simply required to submit “full and complete” reports 
and foundations are expected merely to use “reasonable efforts” and 
“adequate procedures” to ensure compliance.169  A seemingly low 
standard of obligation,170 this leaves latitude for foundations to 
determine that they have enough trust with grantees and have 
provided those grantees with sufficient guidance that they can provide 
general support and still remain confident that the grantee will not 
use the funds for prohibited expenditures. 
Another piece of evidence that supports the notion that Congress 
did not intend to limit general support within the expenditure 
responsibility context is that the grantee is not required to adhere 
strictly to the grant proposal during implementation.  As long as the 
grantee avoids prohibited expenditures, it is well-established that the 
grantee will be considered in compliance with expenditure 
responsibility requirements if the purposes for which they expend the 
grant funds are within the spirit of the original proposal.171  In other 
                                                                                                                                      
 165. See id. 
 166. See 26 U.S.C. § 4945(d)(4)(B) (2014). 
 167. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(1)(i)–(iii) (2015); 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); 
IRM  7.27.19.6.5 (Feb. 22, 1999). 
 168. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)–(e) (2015); IRM 7.27.19.6.14.1–14.2 (Feb. 
22, 1999). 
 169. See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)–(e) (2015); IRM 7.27.19.6.14.1–14.2 (Feb. 22, 
1999). 
 170. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-782, at 7 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2391, at 2392 (noting that expenditure responsibility is only supposed to prohibit the 
narrow circumstance of lobbying on proposed legislation; it is “not intended to 
prevent the examination of broad social, economic, or similar problems”). 
 171. See IRM 7.27.19.6.14.1. (Feb. 22, 1999). 
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words, the grantee need not implement exactly the activities as 
outlined in the original proposal.172  Specifically, the I.R.M. states: 
The diversion of grant funds by a grantee organization to any use 
not in furtherance of a purpose specified in the grant may result in 
the diverted portion of the grant being a taxable expenditure under 
IRC 4945(d)(4). However, the mere use of grant funds for activities 
not planned in the original budget is not treated as a diversion.  The 
use of the grant funds must actually be inconsistent with the original 
purposes of the grant as described in the grant agreement.173 
This implies that a grantee can have some flexibility in their 
programmatic implementation of an expenditure responsibility grant, 
as long as they are sure to avoid the short list of prohibited 
expenditures—a notion aligned with the spirit of general support 
grant making. 
B. Foundation Practice 
Despite the express mention of “general support” in the C.F.R. and 
I.R.M., expenditure responsibility involves a series of requirements 
that foundation managers and counsel—who are primarily concerned 
with protecting a foundation’s tax-exempt status—interpret strictly 
and, remarkably consistently, not to allow that form of grant 
making.174  Under expenditure responsibility, a foundation must be 
able to ensure that a grantee organization spends grant funds solely 
on charitable purposes, and does not spend grant funds on lobbying 
activities, political activities, or for several other forms of 
inappropriate expenditures.175  The most natural way to ensure that 
these requirements are met is to earmark funds for particular 
purposes and provide very specific, restricted funding—or project 
grants—to organizations.176  This earmarking not only contrasts 
directly with the unrestricted nature and purpose of general support, 
but conflicts with what is needed to remain within the general support 
                                                                                                                                      
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58. See also generally Vacin, 
supra note 119; Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deduction for Charitable Contributions: Domestic 
Activities, Foreign Activities, or None of the Above, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 361 (2011); 
NORTON, supra note 17; JONATHON R. MOORE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL PHILANTHROPY 67–68 (2010); BLAZEK, supra note 17; JODY BLAZEK 
& BRUCE R. HOPKINS, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS: TAX LAW AND COMPLIANCE (2014); 
Adler & Petit, supra note 103; Wexler, supra note 113.  
 175. See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(3)(iv) (2015); 26 U.S.C. § 4945(d)(4) (2014). 
 176. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58. 
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safe harbor.177  Given that failing to adhere to these regulations and 
guidelines can result in a series of excise taxes at best and loss of tax 
exemption at worst, it is critical that private foundations stay within 
the boundaries of the law.178  Thus, foundation managers and legal 
counsel advise a safe approach: that only project grants be made 
under the expenditure responsibility framework.179 
Furthermore, the requirements outlined in the expenditure 
responsibility regulations are generally perceived to work against the 
spirit of relinquishing control and providing flexible funds to grantees 
through general support.  In fact, some foundations interpret these 
requirements so strictly that many actually avoid making expenditure 
responsibility grants as institutional policy.180  Michael Sanders, a 
leading lawyer on taxation of exempt organizations, suggests in his 
book Joint Ventures Involving Tax-Exempt Organizations that, “[t]o 
avoid the administrative burden imposed by these special 
requirements for grants to foreign private foundations, it is 
recommended that the foundation consider adopting a general policy 
that grants are to be made solely to public charities or their 
equivalents.”181  When expenditure responsibility grants are made, 
Sanders continues, they require “careful, case-by-case legal 
review.”182 
Though this strict interpretation does reduce risk for a foundation, 
general support grants offer such great value for a wide array of 
organizations that additional risk may be justified for some 
foundations.183  The next section explores the reasons why a more 
flexible interpretation of the expenditure responsibility requirements 
is not only possible, but should be adopted, even while recognizing 
the legitimate risk-averse instincts that many foundations and legal 
practitioners currently exercise. 
                                                                                                                                      
 177. IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb. 22, 1999). 
 178. See IRM 7.27.19.2 (Feb. 22, 1999); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(2)–(3) (2015); see 
also HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-81 (“[S]trict compliance with the 
expenditure responsibility requirements [] is crucial.”). 
 179. See IRM 7.27.19.2 (Feb. 22, 1999); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(2)–(3) (2015); see 
also HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-81. 
 180. See SANDERS, supra note 22, at 1268–69. 
 181. Id. at 1268. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Recall the earlier list of domestic organizations—such as neighborhood 
organizations or hospitals—as well as all foreign organizations who do charitable 
work but who may not meet the distribution requirements to receive an equivalency 
determination. See supra Section I.C. 
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C. The Benefits and Importance of Providing General Support 
Grants: Why Foundations and the IRS Should Interpret 
Expenditure Responsibility Requirements to Allow General 
Support Grant Making 
In this next section, this Note provides an overview of the reasons 
foundations should be increasing their use of general support grants, 
as well as a review of arguments to the contrary. 
1. General Support Is Better for Organizations, Better for 
Innovation, and Better for Society 
There is increasing agreement that general support is better for 
grantee organizations, better for innovation, and ultimately better for 
the public good than project support.184  In addition to the text of the 
regulations and the legislative intent, there are a variety of policies 
that make it prudent to allow an interpretation of the expenditure 
responsibility requirements that includes an option for general 
support grants.  Grantee organizations are much closer to the fields 
they support, and are much more knowledgeable about the intricacies 
of the issues they support than most funders.185  Combined with the 
reality that the fields in which charitable organizations work are often 
complex and ever-changing, for grantees to be effective they require 
some modicum of control over how to adjust funds throughout the 
course of project implementation.186  Providing grantees that space to 
determine how funds are spent allows grantee organizations to adjust 
to realities on the ground and switch course mid-stream when 
necessary in order to foster greater impact and promote better 
results.187 
In a similar vein, funders who take a longer-term view of the 
change they are trying to foster in society recognize the importance of 
strong civil society actors.  General support helps to strengthen 
organizations.188  By allowing the grantee the flexibility to fund a key 
                                                                                                                                      
 184. See, e.g., Alex Daniels, Few Foundations Offer Grants to Deal with the 
Unexpected, OPEN ROAD ALLIANCE (Feb. 1, 2016), http://openroadalliance.org/few-
foundations-offer-grants-to-deal-with-the-unexpected/ [https://perma.cc/FR8T-
ZEQ5]; MCCRAY, supra note 10, at 7; Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the 
Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12; The Beauty of the General Support 
Grant, supra note 10. 
 185. See, e.g., The Beauty of the General Support Grant, supra note 10. 
 186. See Supporting Grantee Capacity: Strengthening Effectiveness Together, 
supra note 92, at 17–18. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See, e.g., General Operating Support (or Unrestricted) Grants, supra note 12; 
MCCRAY, supra note 10, at 7; Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the Capacity 
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project, the use of general operating costs (including training for 
staff), or even the flexibility to shift funds around when new donors 
are acquired, general support funds can play a key role in helping 
organizations to strengthen their overall capacity and effectiveness.189  
By limiting the types of grants that organizations can receive under 
expenditure responsibility rules, the IRS would be working against its 
own stated interests—to allow charitable giving, but to do so in a way 
that is most impactful and responsible given the non-taxable nature of 
the funds.190 
It is also important to revisit some of the important aspects of 
foundation contributions outlined earlier; specifically, foundations 
play a key role in our society as incubators and experimenters, 
providers of services that the government cannot or chooses not to 
provide, as well as key contributors to civil discourse.191  By arming 
foundations with the ability to provide the most effective support 
possible to grantees, the positive impact that foundations can have on 
our domestic and global society is only increased.  Unfortunately, 
expenditure responsibility has generally had the opposite effect: 
pushing foundations to fund pre-existing, stable NGOs that have been 
around for a long time, rather than the innovative, new, emerging 
organizations with fresh ideas.192  Specifically,  
 
the E[xpenditure] R[esponsibility] provision has been criticized as 
being unduly burdensome, especially for small foundations which 
lack administrative capacity to fulfill these requirements.  It is said 
that it is easier for large foundations to supervise a few large grants 
rather than to orchestrate the paperwork on a number of small 
grants.  E[xpenditure] R[esponsibility] is said to encourage routine, 
status quo grants.193   
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In other words, expenditure responsibility has “provided a rationale 
for the continuance of conservative grant-making practices”—a 
reality that certainly needs to be changed, particularly given changes 
in the global context since the passage of this law.194 
2. The Use of the Term “General Support” Matters 
The ability to use the framework and language of “general 
support” is also important.  Though similar flexibility and autonomy 
can be provided to grantees through a project support grant, 
foundations legally can jump in to influence grantee activities at any 
point; with general support, the foundation is obligated to honor the 
grantee’s autonomy (unless the foundation is willing to risk legal 
exposure by not remaining within the general support safe harbor).  
The terminology holds value: “general support” as a phrase means 
something specific, and the more that this term—a proxy for the 
concepts of flexible funding, grantee autonomy, and an awareness and 
leveling of the power dynamic between funder and grantee—can be 
utilized, the better. 
3. The Policy Concerns Laid Out by Lawmakers Are Better 
Addressed by Interpreting Expenditure Responsibility to 
Allow for General Support Grants 
Despite the supporting factors noted above, the legislative history 
also reflects skepticism among some lawmakers of more flexible grant 
making approaches.195  However, providing greater autonomy to 
grantees more effectively counters any mistrust in foundations than 
does limiting the discretion that foundations can pass on to grantee 
organizations: Grantees are much closer than foundations to the 
issues on which they engage and the communities they support, which 
increases grantee responsiveness and accountability to the public due 
both to their proximity to the field and their reliance on donations as 
compared to foundations. 
In a similar manner, the Tax Reform Act sought to increase the 
amount of funds that were available for the public good, rather than 
utilized for self-aggrandizement or foundation overhead costs.196  
                                                                                                                                      
 194. Labovitz, supra note 46, at 78–79. 
 195. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, at 1679 (1969); S. Rep. No. 91-552, at 
2040–41 (1969). 
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GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 3–4 (Comm. Print 
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However, both the actual and perceived strict nature of the 
expenditure responsibility requirements has resulted in “increased 
expenses for legal services and a greater reliance on counsel,” making 
large foundations with high overhead more viable than smaller 
foundations with lower overhead, and running counter to Congress’ 
stated purpose.197  Therefore, by allowing and even clarifying the 
more flexible potential for expenditure responsibility, the impact of 
the law and regulations can become more in-line with the stated 
intention. 
4. Developments in Practice Suggest General Momentum 
Towards Greater Numbers of General Support Grants 
Over time, the IRS regulations have taken on a life of their own. 
Foundation practice has evolved and certain practices have become 
the understood, de facto approach even if not expressly stated.  For 
example, the expenditure responsibility regulations require that 
grantees “establish separate accounts” for funds that have 
expenditure responsibility requirements tied to them.198  However, 
given the challenges (such as high levels of bureaucracy or unwanted 
government attention) and expense that some organizations face in 
opening new accounts, it has become standard practice that a 
foundation will consider the maintenance of separate accounting by 
the recipient organization sufficient to meet this requirement.199 
The IRS has also relaxed a series of regulations regarding grant 
making activity in a manner that indicates a loosening of the 
restrictions on foundation activity generally.200  This reduction in 
scrutiny or skepticism of foundation activities aligns with and 
potentially supports the allowance of more flexible interpretations of 
the expenditure responsibility regulations.  For example, over the past 
two decades, the definition of “charitable” has been expanding in 
nature, signaling that the IRS and even the American public prefer 
that a wider array of activities be considered pursuant of the public 
good and to receive the benefit of the charitable tax exemption.201  
                                                                                                                                      
 197. Labovitz, supra note 46, at 78, 82 (observing that expenditure responsibility 
has “generated more foundation paperwork than any other provision of the Act). But 
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 200. See SANDERS, supra note 22, at 296. 
 201. See id. 
1330 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
This also indicates an increasing trust in the nonprofit sector, thereby 
paralleling the notions that less heavy regulation is warranted. 
A more recent example: the IRS has issued new regulations that 
allow for greater investments in projects that both serve a charitable 
purpose but that also present an opportunity for income for the 
foundation.202  Particularly given the (earlier described) skepticism of 
foundation wealth, this represents a clear departure from past 
practice and regulation of foundations. 
In all of these cases, these changes are for pragmatic reasons: the 
IRS recognizes that when process meets practice, certain 
requirements will have to be flexible.  Given the importance of 
general support grants—as well as their express mention in the 
regulations covering expenditure responsibility—it is reasonable to 
believe that the responsible provision of general support grants within 
the expenditure responsibility requirements falls within this 
category.203 
5. Arguments Against Interpreting Expenditure Responsibility 
Rules to Allow General Support Grants 
On the other hand, there are a number of arguments for why the 
IRS and foundations should not interpret or allow general support 
grants when operating under the expenditure responsibility rules. 
First and foremost is ensuring that tax-exempt funds be expended 
for appropriate purposes: charitable activities.204  This takes on 
particular importance when considering that expenditure 
responsibility grants go to organizations that are not traditional public 
charities:  “In the abstract, this certainly appears reasonable.  If 
organizations are going to enjoy a favored legal status, then they must 
contribute something toward the public interest in exchange for that 
favored status.”205  Some lawmakers fear that subversive activities or 
                                                                                                                                      
 202. Alex Daniels, IRS Issues Rules Favorable to Foundations on Program-
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 205. Id. 
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even terrorism will be funded with charitable dollars unless strict 
enforcement exists.206 
It is important to understand that this concern—as well as others, 
stated in later portions of this section—often stems from, and is 
exacerbated by, a mistrust of foundations.  As Randall G. Holcombe, 
a Professor of Economics at Florida State University, states well in his 
book Writing Off Ideas: 
the primary problem from a public policy standpoint is that 
[f]oundation trustees have a tremendous amount of wealth at their 
disposal that they can spend as they see fit.  While they are charged 
with acting in the public interest, they are accountable to nobody.207 
In fact, there is evidence from the legislative history of the 
expenditure responsibility bill that, prior to the Tax Reform Act of 
1969, there were insufficient rules in place to ensure that private 
foundations were making grants to support exempt purposes only.208  
Because of this, some lawmakers prefer that the government retains 
strict control over the types of grants that foundations can make, 
limiting the scope of discretion afforded to foundations.209  Though 
the value of general support grants is that grantees, not foundations, 
are ultimately afforded greater flexibility and autonomy in how they 
utilize grant funds, foundations do receive an interim increase in 
discretion when serving as the necessary intermediary in the 
disbursement of grant funds: Foundations are afforded the 
opportunity to determine for which organizations it is appropriate 
and reasonable to provide an expenditure responsibility grant, as well 
as when it is appropriate and reasonable to provide grantees with 
flexibility through a general support grant.210 
This lack of trust extends even further than just the assurance that 
foundations fund exempt purposes only.211  As Holcombe states in 
Writing Off Ideas,  
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[there are] two reasons why foundations might warrant closer 
scrutiny than other charitable organizations.  First, they are often 
established with the idea of providing more donor direction funds 
than a typical charity, and second, the funds may be put to more 
imaginative or unconventional uses, which naturally will raise the 
question of the degree to which the public interest is served by the 
[f]oundation.212 
Though in some ways these are justifiable concerns, foundations 
operate in a regulatory environment that ensures the use of tax-
exempt funds for charitable purposes only.  Not only are there 
requirements about what constitutes a charitable expenditure (which 
includes the expenditure responsibility rules), but foundations also 
have to adhere to strict annual disbursement requirements, board 
membership requirements, anti-terrorism regulations, and a variety of 
other features that, if circumvented, will result in excise taxes for both 
the foundation itself and the individual trustees of the organization.213  
In the case of expenditure responsibility grants, specifically, the IRM 
expressly states that the purpose of expenditure responsibility is to 
“impose restrictions which are substantially equivalent to the 
limitations placed on domestic private foundations by IRC 
4945(d).”214  Given the breadth and effectiveness of the restrictions in 
place, it seems reasonable to balance potential risks and rewards in a 
way that allows for greater flexibility to the ultimate grant 
recipients.215  For example, in light of the global trend to restrict civil 
society space, more and more organizations are being forced to 
register as for-profit enterprises despite having a solely charitable 
purpose in the eyes of U.S. tax law; this alone provides great impetus 
to trust that the regulations currently in place allow foundations to 
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provide greater flexibility to international organizations where 
appropriate. 
The third main concern is the notion that tax exemption for 
foundations makes foundation funds subsidized by taxpayers and, 
therefore, public money.  However, this is categorically untrue.  
Foundations are not established to be agents of the state, and in fact 
are intentionally designed to be able to tackle issues and challenges 
that the government otherwise cannot or will not address.216  In 
addition, foundation money is donated by private individuals, and tax 
exemption is granted in exchange for dedicating the organization’s 
efforts to public—rather than private—benefit.217  The State’s power 
of regulation over foundations and other charitable organizations 
should not be conflated with the decision-making authority of private 
individuals in determining how foundation assets are spent: the State 
has the power to regulate but, just as is true with private corporations, 
individuals still retain decision-making authority.218 
A related concern to this notion that tax-exempt dollars are funds 
subsidized by the general public is a desire for those tax-exempt, 
“publically subsidized” funds to remain within the United States, to 
focus on fostering social progress domestically.219  Some lawmakers 
fear that if expenditure responsibility rules were to relax, the funding 
of foreign organizations would become so easy that foreign issues 
would draw much-needed funds that would otherwise be applied 
towards domestic issues.220  Though in some ways this concern cannot 
be quelled for those who find this argument compelling, it has been 
shown that the betterment of global welfare has important impacts 
for domestic well-being as well, meaning funds spent on charitable 
activities abroad do in fact offer domestic benefit.221 
In response to all of these concerns, time has shown that 
foundations work consistently in the public interest, and relatively 
few abuses exist among modern foundations (if they ever existed at 
all).222  As the Chronicle of Philanthropy has proclaimed: 
“Foundations have grown into profoundly public institutions, open 
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and transparent to all.”223  The purpose of foundation regulations was 
to protect against self-dealing or private benefit from public tax 
exemption; the unintended consequence of limiting grantee flexibility 
is not necessary to achieve these goals.  The drafters’ own language 
can now be used against them: “although the tax preferences may 
have been justified at the time of their inception, it is not clear that 
they are needed or desirable in today’s economy.”224  Though perhaps 
this clampdown on foundations was necessary in the late 1960s, the 
rare misuse of funds by foundations means these requirements might 
be outdated.  Therefore, it is time to make clear that expenditure 
responsibility requirements have room for flexibility, and that the IRS 
will respect that discretionary space. 
III.  APPROACHES FOUNDATIONS CAN TAKE TO PROVIDE 
GENERAL SUPPORT GRANTS WHILE OPERATING UNDER 
EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
When a law is complicated or the lines it draws are indistinct, there 
is a normal tendency to steer clear of any activity that involves the 
risk of a violation.  In the case of the foundation provisions, the 
penumbra of the law reaches most of what foundations claim they 
are or should be doing—innovative grants, seed money grants, 
grants that will influence social policy.  Relatively few foundations 
have sufficiently sophisticated staffs—or a deep enough commitment 
to these activities—to persevere when the legality of what they are 
contemplating is in doubt.  For many foundations, the 1969 law is a 
refuge; it provides a rationale for continuing their traditionally 
conservative activities despite the urgings of leaders in the field to 
become more venturesome and bold.225 
Despite the lack of particular guidance in the U.S. Code and the 
C.F.R., and foundations’ risk-averse approach to grant making under 
expenditure responsibility, the law does affirmatively state that 
general support is possible under expenditure responsibility.226  
Therefore, there must be a way for foundations to remain within the 
expenditure responsibility requirements while also providing grantees 
with much-needed flexibility through general support grant making.  
Part III explores potential approaches to providing general support 
while adhering to the expenditure responsibility requirements, 
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followed by a recommendation for clarifying updates to the C.F.R. 
and I.R.M. that confirm the acceptability of making general support 
grants under expenditure responsibility. 
A. Possibilities Under the Existing Legal Framework 
In order to develop potential approaches to general support grant 
making under expenditure responsibility, it is important to remember 
two things: the purposes for making a general support grant rather 
than a project support grant, and the mechanics of the general 
support safe harbor.  Ultimately, a general support grant allows the 
grantee to remain in control of how funds are spent, allowing for 
greater flexibility and responsiveness in implementation of their 
strategy that can result in greater impact and a stronger organization.  
The key element of a general support grant is that funds are not (in 
reality or based on perception) earmarked by the foundation for any 
particular activities or outcomes.  Avoiding earmarking funds for 
particular purposes is necessary in order to remain safely within the 
general support safe harbor.  With this in mind, this Note suggests 
three main ways that a foundation could make a general support 
grant under the existing expenditure responsibility requirements.  The 
following recommendations are intended to apply to international 
organizations that lack equivalency determination227 yet are 
charitable in nature. 
1. Potential Approach 1: Removing the Need for the General 
Support Safe Harbor 
The first approach examines and questions the underlying necessity 
of the general support safe harbor.  The protection provided by this 
safe harbor is only necessary when a grantee conducts any amount of 
lobbying or other prohibited activities228; if, at the end of a grant 
term, the organization conducted no lobbying or other prohibited 
activities, attaining the general support safe harbor is a moot point.  
Therefore, foundation staff should feel comfortable providing an 
expenditure responsibility general support grant to an organization 
that the foundation knows only conducts charitable activities and will 
not conduct any lobbying or other prohibited activities.  This trust can 
be developed through the PGI process, and confirmed in the written 
grant agreement required by expenditure responsibility rules.  The 
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requisite financial reporting can be satisfied with reports that remain 
consistent with the standard interpretation of general support 
reporting requirements: that expenditures not be attributed to any 
particular funding sources in order to avoid the appearance of 
earmarking.  Because—as both the proposal and final reports 
confirm—no prohibited activities were conducted by the grantee, it is 
unnecessary to clarify which activities were funded with the 
expenditure responsibility funds: all expenditures would be 
considered acceptable by the IRS.  This option is the most 
straightforward and presents little risk for foundations, but will only 
be possible in a limited number of circumstances. 
2. Potential Approach 2: Bifurcated Budgets 
A second potential approach to general support grant making 
within the confines of expenditure responsibility acknowledges the 
fungible nature of an organization’s funds.  In fact, the IRS itself 
acknowledges the fungible nature of assets in the creation of the 
general support safe harbor.229  To extrapolate this further: If, during 
the proposal stage of a general support grant, an organization submits 
a projected budget that includes certain prohibited activities, the 
grantee can be asked to bifurcate the budget.  If the organization can 
show that the total funds projected to be spent on non-prohibited 
activities is higher than the amount of the potential grant, a general 
support grant should be considered possible.  After clear 
conversations and perhaps training on prohibited expenditures, the 
required PGI can be used to establish sufficient trust regarding an 
organization’s understanding of prohibited uses for the grant funds 
and that funds used for prohibited expenditures will need to be 
returned.  Of course, this understanding will be confirmed in the 
mandatory written grant agreement.  At the same time, the 
foundation retains the general support safe harbor because they are 
not earmarking funds for particular purposes: the grantee has full 
control to determine how funds are spent within the broad category 
of appropriate, charitable expenditures.  If a foundation desires to 
reduce risk in this scenario a little further, it might then ask for the 
final financial reports to show how the prohibited expenditures were 
covered by funds other than those of the expenditure responsibility 
grant.  That way, the foundation can avoid both earmarking funds at 
the beginning of the grant and the perception of having earmarked 
funds through the request of attribution in the final reports.  It is 
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important to note that this approach is not novel, and is often used in 
the project support context;230 however, it seems possible to replicate 
this in the general support context as well. 
This potential approach becomes complicated if a significant 
portion of the organization’s projected expenditures consist of 
prohibited activities or non-charitable expenditures.  In those cases, 
earmarking by the foundation could be considered to have occurred 
by default.  For example, if an organization is planning to run ten 
projects of roughly equivalent budget sizes, but nine of them are 
lobbying-based and only one is not, taking this approach would, in 
effect, mirror a foundation earmarking funds for that particular 
project (in this case, a mere ten percent of possible activities).  This 
clearly goes against the spirit of general support grant making, and 
would not warrant valid application of the general support safe 
harbor.  Therefore, a foundation must exercise discretion in 
determining when taking this approach would still provide sufficient 
flexibility and decision-making authority to the grantee.  Though not 
current law, the IRS might consider extending the de minimis 
exception relevant to registered 501(c)(3) public charities or 
delineating alternative proportions or percentages—such as a fifteen 
percent maximum in lobbying or other prohibited expenditures—that 
would allow foundations to provide general support through this 
method with more confidence.  This percentage approach is 
strengthened when one considers that this same approach is used in 
other aspects of foundation law: a threshold test is used to determine 
whether an organization is eligible to become a 501(c)(3) non-
profit.231  Appendices C, D, and E illustrate sample expenditure 
responsibility proposals and reports that align with this potential 
approach.232 
3. Potential Approach 3: De-Linking Funds from Specific 
Project Activities or the All/But Approach 
A third potential approach to making a general support grant 
within the confines of current expenditure responsibility requirements 
utilizes a variation on the negotiated general support approach, and 
goes a step further than the second approach outlined above.  Recall 
that with negotiated general support, a foundation can make it clear 
what they do want a grantee organization to do throughout the grant 
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term but, by de-linking the use of the grant funds from helping to 
further those particular projects or outcomes, the foundation stops 
short of tying the funds to particular purposes and can remain within 
the spirit of general support grant making while also retaining the 
general support safe harbor.233  A series of possibilities for general 
support grant making under expenditure responsibility become 
possible if a foundation takes the negotiated general support 
approach and inverts it: rather than telling an organization what they 
should do, foundations could explain merely what they cannot do.  
This way, foundations could ensure that potential general support 
grantees retain a high level of control over how funds are spent, yet 
also be sure that activities include “everything except” or “all but” 
prohibited expenditures.  This departs from the control and 
earmarking to particular outcomes and budget lines present in project 
support grant making, where the grant is for “only this.” 
This all/but approach falls within the boundaries of acceptability 
for both general support grants and expenditure responsibility.  With 
regards to general support, the grantee retains decision-making 
control over two key aspects: one, the activities that they choose to 
conduct and, two, how the funds are expended within the broad 
limitations of not spending funds on prohibited expenditures.  
Combined, these offer the grantee great autonomy and latitude.  
Prior training on appropriate expenditures can, again, be provided by 
the foundation, and the understanding can be confirmed through the 
PGI and written grant agreement.  Expenditure responsibility-
compliant reporting can take either the approach outlined above, or 
can show how foundation funds were expended for non-lobbying 
purposes.  Because the crucial aspect of general support grant making 
is that funds are not tied to particular projects or outcomes at the 
outset, it seems acceptable to consider reporting that shows 
foundation funds were expended on acceptable purposes after the 
fact, as long as there was no prior earmarking of funds.234 
The value of the all/but approach is that it can apply to the greatest 
number of situations; however, it also presents a variety of potential 
burdens and risks.  For example, this approach would require a 
certain level of training for the grantee in order for the foundation to 
build sufficient confidence that the grantee knows what activities to 
avoid with the foundation’s funds.  In addition, this approach presents 
the same threshold problem as noted above: The foundation will have 
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to exercise discretion about whether, based on the percentage 
breakdown of the organization’s activities, there remains a sufficient 
percentage of acceptable uses for the expenditure responsibility funds 
that there is still true decision-making authority for the grantee 
organization about how those funds are expended, thereby allowing 
the foundation to avoid the actual or perceived earmarking of funds 
for particular purposes.  Ultimately, this approach requires a 
foundation to feel comfortable that detailed reporting at the end of a 
grant does not lend the perception of under-the-table earmarking at 
the beginning of a general support grant. 
However, the fact that foundations are not responsible for the 
failure of a grantee to adhere to expenditure responsibility obligations 
supports the idea that lawmakers retained some trust in foundations’ 
commitment to promoting the public good, and are to be given some 
discretion in how they conduct their grant making activities.  This 
discretion can be used to determine the appropriate level of depth for 
the PGI or, perhaps, to determine when a grantee organization might 
be sophisticated enough to manage an all/but approach to an 
expenditure responsibility general support grant.  This determination 
can be easily documented in the PGI documents.  Appendix F 
contains a sample grantee report for this potential approach.235 
B. Recommendations for Minor Adjustments to the C.F.R. 
As referenced above, there are a variety of minor clarifications and 
updates that the IRS could make to the C.F.R. and the I.R.M. that 
could help to clarify how to approach general support grant making in 
a manner that upholds the expenditure responsibility requirements 
yet also provides grantees with greater discretion and control over 
grant funds. 
First, the IRS could issue a general statement that clarifies that 
general support can, in fact, be made under expenditure 
responsibility, as the regulations state.  Specifically, the IRS should 
state that, should the expenditure responsibility requirements (PGI, 
written proposal, signed grant agreement, final reports, and 
foundation disclosure to the IRS) be satisfied, the IRS will accept that 
general support grants are in alignment with existing law and policy, 
and will not undertake further enforcement action. 
Second, the IRS could amend the C.F.R. and the I.R.M. to include 
further guidelines that clarify how general support grants can be 
made under expenditure responsibility, perhaps utilizing the three 
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potential approaches illustrated above.  It is important to note that 
these clarifications would not only remain in alignment with the 
currently existing regulations, but would require no amendments to 
be made to the U.S. Code.  Therefore, this falls solely within the 
ambit of the IRS. 
Specifically, the IRS should provide for a general support safe 
harbor in the case of expenditure responsibility general support 
grants if the grantee conducts merely a de minimis amount of 
lobbying activities or other prohibited expenditures, in the same way 
that the IRS provides this safe harbor for general support grants to 
501(c)(3) organizations and equivalents that conduct a de minimis 
amount of lobbying or other prohibited expenditures.  As described 
earlier, many organizations that might otherwise be eligible to receive 
equivalency determination cannot or do not pursue that option, not 
because they conduct non-charitable activities, but because of 
language barriers or lack of capacity.  Therefore, creation of the 
general support safe harbor would support the funding of those 
smaller, grassroots organizations: not the funding of activities and 
organizations otherwise considered not to be charitable. 
In addition, the IRS could also honor the de minimis exception in 
the case of international organizations that would otherwise be 
considered a 501(c)(3) or equivalent.  This approach would support a 
pragmatic understanding of both the many reasons why foreign 
organizations do not acquire equivalency determination status and 
that money is fungible. 
If the IRS is willing to consider adjustments that represent slight 
departures from past practice (rather than simply a clarification of the 
current regulations), the agency could also begin to accept attribution 
in general support grant reports to particular foundation funds in the 
limited scenario of a general support grant under expenditure 
responsibility to a foreign organization.  Based on the justification 
that the crucial aspect of a general support grant is that grant funds 
are not tied to particular activities at the outset, not that the 
foundation remains fully unaware of how their funds were spent at 
the close of the grant, this would allow foundations to use the all/but 
approach outlined above without the concern that requesting 
financial reports with attribution would somehow generate the 
perception of earmarking. 
By taking any or all of these suggestions, the IRS would be clear 
about its intention to allow general support grant making in the 
context of expenditure responsibility.  By being clear, they would 
encourage foundations to make a higher number of general support 
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grants, knowing that they are not at risk of having to pay excise taxes 
or, in the worst case, losing their exempt status. 
CONCLUSION 
Providing grantees with unrestricted, flexible funds through 
general support grants is crucial to fostering greater social impact, 
prompting innovation, and supporting the development of strong 
organizations.  Given the plain text and policy intentions of the 
expenditure responsibility regulations—as well as the broad and 
effective regulatory framework in which foundations reside—it is 
reasonable to interpret said regulations in a manner that allows the 
use of general support.  The time has come for foundation managers, 
legal counsel, and even the IRS to take a fresh look at the 
expenditure responsibility requirements and act on the potential that 
general support grant making offers.  Whether it be through 
expanded use of the general support safe harbor or by taking an 
all/but approach to funding, foundation staff have a variety of options 
to match varying levels of risk appetite for using general support 
under expenditure responsibility, even in lieu of any formal 
clarifications by the IRS.  With this approach, foundations will better 
equip grantee organizations to take-on and succeed in meeting the 
real-world challenges of their social missions, such as expanding 
human rights, fostering arts and culture, improving public health, and 
expanding education worldwide.  
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APPENDIX A: EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS236 
The expenditure responsibility requirements, as laid out in 26 U.S.C. 
§ 4945 and associated regulations, provide: 
Expenditure responsibility means that the Foundation exerts all 
reasonable efforts and establishes adequate procedures: 
1. To see that the grant is spent only for the purpose for which it 
is made, 
2. To obtain full and complete reports from the grantee 
organization on how the funds are spent, and 
3. To make full and detailed reports on the expenditures to the 
IRS. 
. . .  and may involve one or more of the following elements: 
1. Pre-grant inquiry 
2. Certain commitments by the grantee 
3. Requirements relating to program-related investments 
4. Actions with respect to violations of expenditure responsibility 
requirements 
To meet the expenditure responsibility requirements, each grant 
must be made subject to a written commitment signed by an 
appropriate officer, director, or trustee of the grantee organization.  
This commitment must include the following agreements by the 
grantee: 
1. To repay any amount not used for the purposes of the grant, 
2. To submit full and complete annual reports to the grantor 
foundation on the manner in which the funds are spent and the 
progress made in accomplishing the purposes of the grant, 
3. To keep records of receipts and expenditures and to make its 
books and records available to the grantor at reasonable times and 
4. Not to use any of the funds to influence legislation, to influence 
the outcome of elections, to carry on voter registration drives, to 
make grants to individuals or other organizations or to undertake any 
nonexempt activity, when such use of the funds would be a taxable 
expenditure if made directly by the foundation.  
                                                                                                                                      
 236. 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (2018). 
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY FINANCIAL 
REPORT 
The following sample financial report illustrates how a grantee can 
demonstrate to a foundation funder that foundation funds were spent 
only on permitted activities.  In this sample, the grantee shows that 
Foundation A funds were spent on non-lobbying activities associated 
with “Project A.”  The corresponding narrative report would describe 
the “Project A” activities in more detail, allowing a Foundation to 
confirm that the grantee used the funds on permitted expenditures 
only.  In this scenario, the only funds with expenditure responsibility 
restrictions attached are those from Foundation A. 
 
 
 
  Projected Actual   Fdn A Govt Grant Gen’l Fund Reserves 
Personnel 180,000 180,000     150,000 30,000   
Office 
Rent 20,000 20,000       20,000   
Utilities 10,000 9,800       9800   
Travel 10,000 9,500     9500 
 
  
               
Project A           
 
  
 
Lobbying 70,000 73,000       
 
  
          
Activity 1 35,000 34,500       34,500   
          
Activity 2 35,000 38,500       38,500   
 Non-
Lobbying 110,000 107,000       
 
  
          
Activity 1 25,000 32,000   32,000   
 
  
          
Activity 2 25,000 19,000   19,000   
 
  
          
Activity 3 25,000 26,500   26,500   
 
  
          
Activity 4 35,000 29,500   22,500   7000   
TOTAL 180,000 180,000       
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  Projected Actual   Fdn A Govt Grant Gen’l Fund Reserves 
Project B           
 
  
 
Lobbying 50,000 38,000       
 
  
          
Activity 1 50,000 38,000     38,000 
 
  
 Non-
Lobbying 50,000 62,000       
 
  
          
Activity 1 50,000 62,000     62,000 
 
  
TOTAL 100,000 100,000       
 
  
               
Project C           
 
  
       
Lobbying 0 0       
 
  
 Non-
Lobbying 100,000 102,000       
            
Activity 1 55,000 53,000       53,000   
          
Activity 2 15,000 17,500     15,000 500 2000 
          
Activity 3 30,000 31,500     5,500 26,000   
TOTAL 100,000 102,000       
 
  
               
GRAND 
TOTAL 600,000 601,300   100,000 280,000 219,300 2000 
 
“Fdn A” = Foundation A 
“Govt Grant” = Government Grant 
“Gen’l Fund” = general donations, made by private individuals, that the organization 
can use as they please 
“Reserves” = the grantee’s reserve fund  
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APPENDIX C: SAMPLE EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY PROPOSAL 
This sample expenditure responsibility grant proposal provides a 
projected organizational budget.  The organization bifurcates the 
budget, demonstrating their understanding of U.S. funding 
restrictions.  If Foundation A were considering a $100,000 grant to 
this organization, they can feel comfortable knowing that there are 
sufficient ways that the organization can spend those funds on 
permitted (e.g., Non-Lobbying) activities. 
 
  Projected Organizational Budget 
OVERHEAD   
       Personnel 200,000 
       Office Rent 25,000 
       Utilities 10,000 
       Travel 15,000 
TOTAL 250,000 
    
PROJECT A   
  Lobbying 20,000 
          Activity 1 15,000 
          Activity 2 5,000 
  Non-Lobbying 250,000 
          Activity 1 95,000 
          Activity 2 50,000 
          Activity 3 45,000 
          Activity 4 60,000 
TOTAL 270,000 
    
PROJECT B   
  Lobbying 0 
  Non-Lobbying 50,000 
          Activity 1 50,000 
TOTAL 50,000 
    
PROJECT C   
  Lobbying 5000 
         Activity 1 5,000 
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  Projected Organizational Budget 
  Non-Lobbying 95,000 
         Activity 1 55,000 
          Activity 2 15,000 
          Activity 3 25,000 
TOTAL 100,000 
    
Total Overhead 250,000 
Total Lobbying 25,000 
Total Non-Lobbying 395,000 
GRAND TOTAL 670,000 
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APPENDIX D: SAMPLE EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 1 
This sample expenditure responsibility financial report shows 
actual spending as compared to the originally projected 
organizational budget.  Though the actual spending is slightly 
different than what was projected, the Foundation can see that there 
are many ways the $100,000 grant could have been spent that aligns 
with prohibitions on funding (specifically, $643,020 of the budget).  
The narrative report would confirm that the grantee did only apply 
the grant to permitted activities. 
 
 Projected Organizational 
Budget 
Actual Spending 
Overhead     
       Personnel 200,000 200,000 
       Office Rent 25,000 25,000 
       Utilities 10,000 9,800 
       Travel 15,000 13,400 
TOTAL 250,000 248,200 
      
PROJECT A     
       Lobbying 20,000 19,200 
          Activity 1 15,000 13,000 
          Activity 2 5,000 6200 
  Non-Lobbying 250,000 247,300 
          Activity 1 95,000 94,900 
          Activity 2 50,000 46,200 
          Activity 3 45,000 45,000 
          Activity 4 60,000 61,200 
TOTAL 270,000 266,500 
      
PROJECT B     
  Lobbying 0 0 
  Non-Lobbying 50,000 50,020 
          Activity 1 50,000 50,020 
TOTAL 50,000 50,020 
      
PROJECT C     
  Lobbying 5000 2000 
          Activity 1 5,000 2,000 
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 Projected Organizational 
Budget 
Actual Spending 
  Non-Lobbying 95,000 97,500 
          Activity 1 55,000 56,500 
          Activity 2 15,000 14,000 
          Activity 3 25,000 27,000 
TOTAL 100,000 99,500 
      
Total Overhead 250,000 248,200 
Total Lobbying 25,000 21,200 
Total Non-Lobbying 395,000 394,820 
GRAND TOTAL 670,000 664,220 
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APPENDIX E: SAMPLE EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2 
This sample expenditure responsibility financial report 
demonstrates actual spending—just as in the sample provided in 
Appendix C—but also demonstrates how the organization covered 
the limited number of costs that could not be funded by the 
expenditure responsibility grant.  This way, the Foundation has 
assurance that grant funds were used appropriately, while still 
avoiding attribution of Foundation funds that might lend the 
appearance of earmarking. 
 
  
Projected Organizational 
Budget 
Actual 
Spending 
Organization 
General Fund 
OVERHEAD       
       Personnel 200,000 200,000   
    Office Rent 25,000 25,000   
       Utilities 10,000 9,800   
       Travel 15,000 13,400   
TOTAL 250,000 248,200   
        
PROJECT A       
 Lobbying 20,000 19,200 19,200 
        Activity 1 15,000 13,000   
        Activity 2 5,000 6200   
 Non-Lobbying 250,000 247,300   
        Activity 1 95,000 94,900   
        Activity 2 50,000 46,200   
        Activity 3 45,000 45,000   
        Activity 4 60,000 61,200   
TOTAL 270,000 266,500   
        
PROJECT B       
 Lobbying 0 0   
 Non-Lobbying 50,000 50,020   
        Activity 1 50,000 50,020   
TOTAL 50,000 50,020   
        
PROJECT C       
  Lobbying 5000 2000 2000 
        Activity 1 5,000 2,000   
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Projected Organizational 
Budget 
Actual 
Spending 
Organization 
General Fund 
 Non-Lobbying 95,000 97,500   
        Activity 1 55,000 56,500   
        Activity 2 15,000 14,000   
        Activity 3 25,000 27,000   
TOTAL 100,000 99,500   
        
Total Overhead 250,000 248,200   
Total Lobbying 25,000 21,200 21,200 
Total Non-Lobbying 395,000 394,820   
GRAND TOTAL 670,000 664,220   
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APPENDIX F: SAMPLE EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 3 
In this sample financial report, the grantee provides a full 
breakdown of how they applied specific funds to specific activities.  
This allows Foundation A to confirm that the expenditure 
responsibility grant covered solely permitted costs.  This is an 
acceptable report for a general support grant because the grantee still 
had the ability to choose where to spend the funds, they are simply 
now reporting on what decisions they made.   
 
 
  
Projected Organizational 
Budget 
Actual 
Spending   Fdn A Fdn B 
Govt 
Grant 
Gen’l 
Fund 
OVERHEAD               
       Personnel 200,000 200,000       150,000 50,000 
       Office Rent 25,000 25,000     2,500 10,000 12,500 
       Utilities 10,000 9,800         9,800 
       Travel 15,000 13,400       10,000 3400 
TOTAL 250,000 248,200           
                
PROJECT A               
   Lobbying 20,000 19,200           
            Activity 1 15,000 13,000         13,000 
            Activity 2 5,000 6200         6200 
   Non-Lobbying 250,000 247,300           
            Activity 1 95,000 94,900   50,000   44,900   
            Activity 2 50,000 46,200   46,200       
            Activity 3 45,000 45,000   3,800   41,200   
            Activity 4 60,000 61,200       61,200   
TOTAL 270,000 266,500           
                
PROJECT B               
   Lobbying 0 0           
   Non-Lobbying 50,000 50,020           
            Activity 1 50,000 50,020     50,000   20 
TOTAL 50,000 50,020           
                
PROJECT C               
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Projected Organizational 
Budget 
Actual 
Spending   Fdn A Fdn B 
Govt 
Grant 
Gen’l 
Fund 
   Lobbying 5000 2000           
            Activity 1 5,000 2,000         2000 
   Non-Lobbying 95,000 97,500           
            Activity 1 55,000 56,500     56,500     
            Activity 2 15,000 14,000     14,000     
            Activity 3 25,000 27,000     27,000     
TOTAL 100,000 99,500           
                
Total Overhead 250,000 248,200   0 2,500 170,000 75,700 
Total Lobbying 25,000 21,200   0 0 0 21,200 
Total Non-Lobbying 395,000 394,820   100,000 147,500 147,300 20 
GRAND TOTAL 670,000 664,220   100,000 150,000 317,300 96,920 
 
